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AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE CONSTITUTION:
AN ARGUMENT FOR NATIONHOOD*
Steven Paul McSloy**
The Indian nations' of North America were recognized as independent sovereign powers by European monarchs and legal scholars
throughout the colonial area. 2 Recognition of this autonomy and
of the international nature of the United States-Indian relationship is implicit in both the Constitution and the early history of
the nation.3 The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Marshall
articulated this view and denied the legitimacy of the imposition
of federal and state power over the affairs of the Indian nations,
with the exception of certain limitations on their external sovereign

* Earlier versions of Parts I & II of this Article previously appeared in Comment,
Toward Consent and Cooperation:Reconsideringthe Political Status of Indian Nations,
22 HALv. C.R.-C.L, L. REv. 507 (1987) (Copyright © 1987 by the President and Fellows
of Harvard College). I would like to thank my co-authors and editor for their help on
that earlier project, and also Professor Frank Michelman of the Harvard Law School.
Errors are mine alone.
** Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, New York. B.A., New York
University, 1985; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1988.
1. The term "Indian nation" more accurately describes the political status of American
Indian peoples than the term "tribe." Because judicial opinions often use the term "tribe,"
however, it will be used occasionally in this article for the sake of clarity. Masculine pronouns used herein should be read to refer to both men and women.

2. See generally F. JENNINGs, THE INVAsioN OF AmRICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM,

AND THB CANT OF CONQUEST 15-31 (1975); F. P. PRUCHA, THE INDIANS IN AmucAN
SocIETY 29-32 (1985); Comment, Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the
PoliticalStatus of Indian Nations, 22 HA~v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv., 507, 511-14 (1987); F.
de Victoria, De Indis et de Jure Bell! Relectiones (Reflections On the Indians and On
the Law of War) (E. Nys ed. & J. Bate trans. 1917) (J. Simon rev. ed. 1696), in CLAssics
oF INTERNATIONAL LAW (J. Scott ed. 1917). Victoria is considered to be the founder of

international law and his theories formed the basic framework of the relationship between
the Indian peoples and the colonists of the New World, as reflected in documents as various
as a 1537 Papal Bull and the 1787 Northwest Ordinance. See Cohen, The Spanish Origin
of Indian Rights In the Law of the United States, 31 GEo. L. REV, 1, 11-12, 17 (1942).
3. "The absence of a general power over Indian affairs in the Constitution is not
surprising ... [since] the framers regarded Indian tribes as sovereign nations." Newton,
FederalPower over Indians; Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U, PA. L, REV,
195, 200 (1984). See also id at 237-38; F. PRocmA, AEPncAN INDIAN POLICY N Tam
FoRATIv YEARS, 140-42 (1962); Aaiumc
INDIAN Poracy REVIEW CoMssIoN [AIPRC],
TAsK FoRcE ONE: TRUsT RESPONSIBILITI[ES AND THE FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSIP, IN-

cLUDING TREATY REVIEw, FINAL REPORT 53 (Comm. Print 1976) (relationship between
Indian nations and the United States is "deeply rooted in international law"). See generally
Comment, supra note 2, at 513-22.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

rights to enter into treaties with European powers or to freely
alienate their lands without the consent of the United States.
Today, however, the federal government exercises far-reaching
power over the lives of Indians and the internal affairs of Indian
nations.5 Though in some respects bounded by the Bill of Rights,6
this broad exercise of federal power has reduced the Indian nations
to a status variously described as that of a special interest group,7
a judicially-protected minority,8 or "some new kind of federal
municipalit[y]." 9 While the federal government often claims to

4.. "Chief Justice Marshall had recognized only two limitations [on Indian
sovereignty]: the tribes could not convey their land to anyone other than the United States,
and the tribes could not treat with foreign powers." Canby, The Status of Indian Tribes
in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REv. 1, 8 (1987). See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Comment, supra note 2, at 514-22
(discussing Johnson, Cherokee Nation and Worcester); Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal
Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States, 27 BuiAio L. Rav. 637 (1978)
(same). The limitations on the Indians rights' to treat with European nations and to freely
alienale their lands were imposed as political measures aimed at ensuring the peaceful
and orderly settlement of the frontier, the ability to establish clear title to settled lands
and to prevent foreign influence and provocation. See Newton, supra note 3, at 208 n.
69. Except for the discussions of the proper spheres of federal versus state power, these
seminal Marshall Court cases did not involve constitutional questions but rather the domestic
ramifications of inter-sovereign political arrangements. See generally Comment, supra note
2.
5. See, e.g., Barsh, Is There Any Indian "Law" Left? A Review of the Supreme
Court's 1982 Term, 59 WASH. L. REV. 863, 893 (1984).
6. As citizens, Indians are ostensibly protected by the Bill of Rights to the same
extent as other Americans. See Goodluck v. Apache County, 417 F. Supp. 13 (D. Ariz.
1975) (three judge court), aff'd without opinion sub nom Apache County v. United States,
429 U.S. 876 (1976). While certain Indian rights, such as the right to vote, have been
judicially enforced, see, e.g., id., other rights, such as the right to just compensation under
the fifth amendment for the taking of property, have not been nearly as well protected.
See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
7. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE RoAD: INDIAN TRIBEs AND PoLrrrcAL LIBERTY 243-44 (1980) (discussing the "ethnic Indian movement"); id. at 219 (discussing Indian
lobbying).
8. This approach is advocated in Newton, supra note 3, at 245-46, and in The Supreme
Court, 1984 Term-Leading Cases, 99 HAgv. L. REv. 120, 264 n.80 (1985).
9. Indian Law Resource Center, The Supreme Court: New Cause for Alarm, in
RETHRKING INDIAN LAW

73, 74 (1982); see Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 378-79

(9th Cir. 1965) (Fort Belknap Tribal courts are "arms of the federal government"); see
also Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 903 (1970) (same analysis of Yakima Tribal Courts). But see United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313 (1978) (no double jeopardy in prosecution by both tribal and state courts).
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act in furtherance of Indian "self-determination," 10 both it and
the governments of the states"' continue to expand their jurisdiction and power over Indian peoples. This article examines the legal

doctrines used to justify federal power over Indian nations and
challenges their legitimacy and constitutionality.

L

Modern Plenary Power

A recognized axiom of United States' jurisprudence with regard
to the Indian nations is that the federal government is said to
hold "plenary power" over the Indian nations.2 In delineating
the scope of this plenary power, the Supreme Court has in recent
years stated that Indian tribal autonomy exists "only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance' '1 3 and
that Congress holds " 'paramount power over the property of
the Indians.' ""' The United States ostensibly recognizes the Indian

10. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 450a (1982) ("Congress hereby recognizes the obligation ... to respond to the strong
expression of the Indian people for self-determination . . ."); President Reagan's Statement on Indian Policy, PuB. PAPEas OF RONALD REAGAN 96, 96 (Jan. 24, 1983) ("Our
policy is to reaffirm dealing with Indian Tribes on a government-to-government basis and
to pursue the policy of self-government for Indian Tribes"); Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v.
LaPlante, 107 S. Ct. 971, 975 (1987) ("[The Supreme Court has] repeatedly recognized
the Federal Government's longstanding policy of encouraging tribal self-government.").
See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 180-206 (1982 ed.) (discussing era of "self-determination" in United States Indian law, 1961 to present).
11. On the expansion of state power over the Indian nations, which is not directly
addressed in this article, see Comment, supra note 2, at 556-86; Canby, supra note 4.
12. "[Ihe power of the Federal Government over the Indian tribes is plenary."
National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985);
see also COEN, supra note 10, at 207; Newton, supra note 3, at 199-236.
13. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); see also Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) ("Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify,
or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess.");
Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14 (Oct. 25, 1934), reprinted in I Opinions
of the Solicitor 445, 451.
14. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 408 (1980) (quoting Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903)). The Court has held, however, that" '[t]he
power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it is not absolute.' "
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (quoting United
States v. Alcea Bank of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946) (plurality)). For expanded
discussions of the development and scope of federal plenary power, see Comment, supra
note 2, at 522-35 and Newton, supra note 3.
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nations as possessing " 'inherent powers of a limited sovereignty
which has never been extinguished,' ",II but holds that "[b]y specific
treaty provision [the Indians] yielded up [certain] sovereign powers;
by statute, in the exercise of its plenary control, Congress has
removed still others."' 6 This article argues that the plenary power
doctrine lacks constitutional support and violates the inherent
sovereignty of Indian nations, and thus that the United States may
hold power over an Indian nation only where the Indian nation
has specifically "yielded up" such power. 7 In the final analysis,
the Indian nations' inherent and historical status as wholly outside the United States federal system precludes the assertion of
power over them other than by their express consent."
A cardinal principle of constitutional law is that Congress cannot exercise power not specifically or implicitly enumerated in the
Constitution. 9 Only in 1974 in Morton v. Mancari,20 however,
did the Supreme Court attempt to ground congressional plenary
power over Indians in the Constitution. The MancariCourt stated
that plenary power is "drawn both explicitly and implicitly from
the Constitution itself ' 2' and thereby affirmed the necessity of

15. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (quoting F. CoHEN, HArNDBOOx OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945) (original emphasis omitted). See also Talton

v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
16. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
17. In 1866 the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion, writing that the Indians'
"situalion ...can only be changed by treaty stipulation, or a voluntary abandonment
of their tribal organization." The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (6 Wall.) 737, 757 (1866).
18. This article presupposes peaceful, non-military interaction between the Indian
nations and the United States. Certainly this has not always been the case, and the idea
of conquest has often been used as a justification for United States power. See Johnson
v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588-89 (1823); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,
348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955). But see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 545
(1832). However, the illegitimacy of conquest as a rationale for the exertion of political
control, see Clinebell & Thomson, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of
Native Americans under InternationalLaw, 27 BuFFALo L. REv. 669, 687-92 (1978), and
the contemporary mootness of the idea of conquest together render it irrelevant as either
a justification of the past or an option for the future.
19. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 88 (1907); McCuloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819); L. TamE, AimmcAN CONsnTIuTlioNA LAW § 5-2
(2d ed. 1988).
20. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
21. 417 U.S. at 551-52; see also Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430
U.S. 73, 83 (1977) (plenary power is "rooted in the Constitution").
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and commanded an inquiry into the constitutional sources of that
power. Previously, the Court had not required
a constitutional
22
basis for upholding federal plenary power.
Because of this new-found need for constitutional legitimacy,
the Supreme Court has increasingly sought, albeit in hindsight,
to establish a constitutional basis for congressional plenary power
over Indians 23 in order to provide a foundation other than historical
circumstance or inherent power for its exercise. As a result, the

22. See Newton, supra note 3, at 214 ("Acknowledging that no existing constitutional provision granted Congress [the] right to govern Indian affairs, the [Supreme] Court
found [such power] to be inherent [in the federal government]") (discussing United States
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)); Comment, supra note 2, at 528-29 (same). See also
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-68 (1903). Felix Cohen had written in his
famous Handbook that it might be "captious to point out that there is excellent authority
for the view that Congress has no constitutional power over Indians except what is conferred by the commerce clause and other clauses of [the] Constitution." F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 90 (1942), quoted in Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian
Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 1, 59 n.280 (1987).
The Court's holding in Kagama, which forms the cornerstone of the "plenary power"
doctrine and which best exemplifies the doctrine's basis in a theory of inherent powers,
its historical contingency, and its profound racism and paternalism, deserves quotation
in full:
These Indian tribes are wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the
United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political
rights.... From their very weakness and helplessness, . . . there arises the duty of
protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive
and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well
as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government,
because it has never existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within
the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and
because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
118 U.S. at 383-84 (emphasis in original). For further discussion of Kagama, see Comment, supra note 2, at 526-29.
The Mancari Court noted the argument made in Kagama that federal power over Indians was based solely on their status as "helpless" and "dependent," but held that this
was merely a statement of the "special relationship" between Indians and the United States
and not a source of federal power. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552. Thus, it can be fairly stated
that:
In modern times, the Supreme Court has apparently repudiated both the ethnocentric
overtones of the doctrine of plenary power and the doctrine itself, at least as far as
the doctrine suggests it has an extra-constitutional source or is a power unlimited by
other constitutional provisions.
Newton, supra note 3, at 228. See also id. at 228-36; F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 219.
23. See Newton, supra note 3, at 230-31.
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Court has stated that "it is now generally recognized that [federal
power over Indian affairs] derives from federal responsibility for
regulating commerce with the Indian tribes and from treaty

making. ' 24 This article argues that although both the Indian commerce clause z5 and the treaty power 26 confer power upon the federal
government, they do so in specific and limited ways, and they
cannot support, either alone or together, the doctrine of plenary

power and the massive structure of federal Indian law and
legislation.
While the Court has held that Congress' ostensible plenary power
is constitutionally founded upon treaties and the commerce clause,

there is a third alleged source of federal power which acts by way
of negation of Indian sovereignty. This is the concept of "implicit divestiture, ' 27 which has its genesis in the Marshall Court
cases divesting certain external sovereign powers of the Indian na-

24. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973); see
also F. Cohen, supra note 10, at 211. The Court has occasionally relied on other constitutional provisions as bases for plenary power. The supremacy clause, U.S. Const. art. VI,
cl. 2, has been cited for this purpose, see Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,
425 U.S. 463, 481 n.17 (1976); F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 211, despite the fact that
the clause confers no independent power of its own upon the national government. The
war powers, U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-16, which "underlay much of the federal exercise of authority over Indians during the early history of the Republic," F. Cohen, supra
note 10, at 210, cannot provide a constitutional source of federal plenary power outside
the context of hostilities or military occupation, and therefore are no longer applicable
to Indians. See also id. at 210 nn.20-21 (discussing various other constitutional provisions
at times tenuously relied upon by the Court).
A longstanding obstacle to coherent constitutional analysis of the federal government's
exercis. of power over Indian nations had been the judiciary's frequent invocation of
the "political question" doctrine with regard to Indian affairs. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 281 (1955); Lone Wolf v. Hitchock, 187 U.S.
553, 565 (1903); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846). The application of the political question doctrine to Indian affairs was finally repudiated in Delaware
Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977), and in United States v. Sioux
Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980).
25. The Indian commerce clause is contained in U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "Congress shall have the power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
26. The treaty power is found at U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2: "[The Executive]
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." The supremacy clause provides that
"all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
27. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). See also Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-10 (1978). A fourth alleged source of federal power, the
"trust relationship," see infra note 115, is discussed at length in Section II of this Article.
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tions by virtue of their status as "domestic dependent nations" 2 8
and which has been asserted in recent decades as a rationale for

limiting the Indian nations' ability to exercise jurisdictional and
regulatory power over their territory, over non-Indians, and with

regard to the states.29 The 1978 case of Oliphant v. Suquamish

Indian Tribe3" represented "the first time in 150 years [that] there

was an expansion of the list of tribal powers held to be inconsistent with the status of the tribes as domestic dependent nations."'"

The Court in Oliphant held that the United States' interest in protecting the "personal liberty '

32

of its non-Indian citizens meant

that in "submitting to the over-riding sovereignty of the United
States, Indian tribes necessarily give up their power to [exercise
criminal jurisdiction over] non-Indian citizens of the United States

except in a manner acceptable to Congress." '3 3 More recent cases
have extended the divestiture concept from dealing with such fun-

damental questions of inter-sovereign relations as criminal jurisdiction and foreign alliances to holding that certain civil jurisdic-

tional and regulatory powers have been implicitly withdrawn 3 and
even that the Indian nations may be divested of power in any
35

area where there is a "lack of a tradition of self-government."

As with the Marshall Court cases, however, these decisions were

not decided as matters of constitutional law but instead represent
judicial pronouncements upon inter-sovereign political relation-

ships. The most fundamental problem with the implicit divestiture
doctrine is that it represents an ad hoc judicial withdrawal of In-

28. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18. See also Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574, 603-05; supra, note 4.
29. See, e.g., Oliphant; Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Rice v. Relmer,
463 U.S. 713 (1983). "In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not
withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent
status." Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
30. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
31. Canby, supra note 4, at 8.
32. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
33. Id. For criticism of the Court's holding, see Canby, supra note 4, at 8-9; Comment,
supra note 2, at 567-68.
34. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563-67 (1981) (tribe implicitly
divested of power to regulate hunting and fishing). "[The] exercise of tribal power beyond
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation." Id. at 564.
35. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 731 (1983). See also id. at 718-20. But see Barsh,
supra note 5, at 876.
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without any principled preconception of that

sovereignty, without reference to international law and without

reference to the doctrine of retained rights.17 Whdt is required

is that the Supreme Court recognize that in the absehce of a ireaty su:rrendering rights to the United States, Indian nations retain
all their sovereign power, particularly with regard to internal matters of regulation and jurisdiction.38 Some Indian nations may
have voluntarily surrendered certain of their sovereign powers
without formal treaties, but such questions should be determined
by reference to declared and customary39 international law.
Divestiture is not problematic to the extent that it is an overt
political matter handled pursuant to the treaty power or under
international law, but the implicit and judicial aspects of the implicit divestiture doctrine do not comport with the inherent and
ostensibly recognized sovereignty of the Indian nations. Fundamental questions concerning jurisdiction, regulation and other sovereign

powers should be handled through treaty negotiations, and not
through one-sided, open-ended judicial "activism in which [the]
Court should not indulge." ' Making "implicit divestiture" explicit would properly place the idea of delegated or surrendered

powers back under the aegis of the treaty power, which along
with Congress' power to regulate commerce are the only judicially recognized and decidedly limited constitutional authorizations
of United States action with regard to the Indian nations.

36. See Comment, Tribal Sovereignty and the Supreme Court's 1977-1978 Term, 4
B.Y.U. L. REv. 911, 927 n.83, 935 (1978).
37. Under the doctrine of retained rights, Indian treaties are held to be " 'a grant
of rights from [the Indians and] a reservation of those not granted.' " Wheeler, 435 U.S.
at 327 11.24 (quoting United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)). See also supra
note 17.
38. See, e.g., the terse, one-paragraph dissent in Oliphant, which held that
the 'power to perserve order on the reservation ... is a sine qua non of the sovereignty
that the Suquamish originally possessed.' . . . In the absence of affirmative withdrawal
by treaty or statute, I am of the view that Indian tribes enjoy as a necessary aspect
of their retained sovereignty the right to try and punish all persons who commit offenses
against tribal law within the reservation.
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting the lower court's decision
in Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)).

39. See A. D'AmAsTo, Tan

CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1971).

40. Rice, 463 U.S. at 744 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). One commentator argues that
"implicit divestiture is a judicial analogue of the 'plenary power' doctrine: not only Congress,
but the courts as well may invoke national policy to extinguish tribal rights." Barsh, supra
note 5, at 870. See also Canby, supra note 4, at 16.
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The Indian Commerce Clause
Chief Justice Marshall made clear in 1832 in Worcester v.

Georgia4 that the Indian commerce clause was primarily a function of the Framers' desire to vest exclusive power over Indian

trade in Congress and not the states.42 In 1886 the Supreme Court,

though upholding broad federal power over Indians on other

dubious grounds, reaffirmed this idea and denied that the clause

provided any basis for the exercise of power over Indian nations.43
While the commerce clause was therefore not seen as granting
the power to regulate the internal affairs of the Indian nations

for nearly a century after the Framing, it has nonetheless emerged as a justification for federal plenary power through a gradual
series of cases in modern times.44 It is, however, "a long, twisted
path indeed from the Framers' decision to give Congress the exclusive power to regulate commerce and other relations with the

Indian tribes to the modern assertion of plenary power over
them.""' The Court's recent reliance on the Indian commerce clause
seems to be a manifestation of its need to find constitutional support for the exercise of federal power over Indians to replace the
racial and paternalistic notions which previously were held to support such power.4 6 The jurisprudence of the commerce clause,

41. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
42. Id. at 561. See Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 OR. L. Rv.
29, 35-39 (1983). Given the Framers' debates over the division of state and federal authority
regarding Indian affairs and the final result in favor of exclusive federal power, see
Comment, supra note 2, at notes 24, 59 and accompanying text, the separate enumeration
of "Indian tribes" in the commerce clause, as distinct from foreign nations, is probably
most accurately seen as specifically including the Indian nations within the reach of federal
foreign relations powers. The term "foreign nations" does not intuitively include Indian
nations, and thus the omission of a separate mention of the Indian tribes might have
left open the possibility of state exercise of power over them. Marshall, however, interpreted the separate enumeration of Indians as recognizing a third category of "domestic
dependent nations," which were nonetheless recognized as sovereign and with whom the
federal government held exclusive authority to regulate commercial relations. See Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
43. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886); see also Worcester,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 592 (McLean, J., concurring).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45 (1913) (upholding liquor
prohibition in Indian country); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380
U.S. 685, 691 n.18 (1965) (State tax on Indian trader preempted); United States v. John,
437 U.S. 634, 652-53 (1978) (State jurisdiction over Indian country preempted).
45. Clinton, Book Review, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 846, 859 (1980).
46. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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however, does not support its use as a justification for upholding

federal plenary power.
In the modern era, the power of Congress over the states

pursuant to the interstate commerce clause, like federal power over
Indians, has been greatly expanded, to the extent that congres-

sional power within the federal system is now virtually unlimited.41

An examination of the principles underlying the development of

modern interstate commerce clause jurisprudence, however, shows
that the broad construction of federal power under the interstate
commerce clause is inapplicable to the Indian commerce clause
because of the Indian nations' lack of political process protec-

tions. An expansive reading of the Indian commerce clause as
granting power over Indian nations is therefore inappropriate.

James Madison argued in the Federalist Papers that although
there were no enumerated limitations on the powers of Congress
over the states pursuant to the commerce clause, the distribution

of powers in the federal system imposed constraints on its unbridled exercise. 8 Specifically, Madison argued that the local
character and constituency of each member of Congress, 9 the
structure of elections for the Presidency"0 and for the Senate,'

and the states' control over voting eligibility for representation
in the House of Representatives 52 all served to constrain federal
government from encroaching upon
power and prevent the federal
5 3
the rights of the states.

47. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
276 (1981) ("congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce"
requires only that "any rational basis for such a finding" exists); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) ("no form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory
power granted by the commerce clause to Congress."). See generally A. Cox, THE COURT
AND THE CONSTITUnON 166, 170-73 (1987).
48. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45 & 46 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 48, at 296 ("[a] local spirit will infallibly
prevail . .. in the members of Congress").
50. THE FEDERAIST No. 45, supra note 48, at 291. The Electoral College, both a
restriction on the popular vote and a forum for state interests, is established in U.S. CoNsT.
art. II § 1, cl. 2-3.
51. THE FEDERALST No. 45, supra note 48, at 291. The Constitution originally provided for the indirect election of Senator by the state legislatures. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 3, cl. 1. Article V forbids the divestment of a state's senatorial representation, even
by constitutional amendment, without its consent.
52. THE FEDERA IsT No. 45, supra note 48, at 291; U.S. CONST. art. I § 2.
53. "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government
are few and defined." THE FEDERALIT No. 45, supra note 48, at 292.
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Though several of these restraints are no longer viable," the

constituency of congressional delegations has been widely expanded
through the implementation of universal suffrage,

5

allowing for

greater accountability to local interests in the federal government.
Because these structural aspects of the national political system

act as a check to protect state interests,5 6 the Supreme Court has
declined to impose any limits on congressional power pursuant

to the interstate commerce clause against claims by the states of

infringement of their rights within the federal system. 7
Indian nations, however, do not enjoy any of the political process protections available to the states. The Supreme Court's rationale for permitting unlimited federal power under the interstate

commerce clause is therefore inapplicable to the Indian commerce
clause." The constitutional provision that "Indians not taxed"

(meaning all Indians except for the few that had completely
assimilated and become citizens and taxpayers) were not to be

54. The indirect election of Senators was repealed in 1913. U.S. CoNrs. amend. XVII.
The President and Vice-President are now elected together, U.S. CoNsT. amend. XII, from
national political parties. Finally, the Electoral College, while still a partial restraint on
direct popular election for the Presidency, has ceased to be a viable forum for state debate.
See A. PAUL, THE CONSERVATrVE CRIsis AND Tns RULE OF LAW 234 (1976 reprint).
55. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV (right to vote "shall not be denied or abridged on
account of race"); id., amend. XIX (female suffrage); id., amend. XXIV (poll taxes prohibited); id., amend. XVI (18 year old suffrage); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-61
(1964) (Constitution protects the suffrage of all qualified voters).
56. See, e.g., Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543
(1954); J. CHOPER, JuDIcIAL REVIEW AND THE NAToNAL PorMcAL PROCESS 171-259 (1980).
Both authors make this Madisonian argument as the basis for asserting, to different degrees,
that judicial review of state challenges to federal acts made pursuant to Congress' enumerated
powers is inappropriate, since the states should look to the national political process for
a remedy.
57. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
"State sovereign interests are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent
in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal
power." Id. at 552. See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (tenth
amendment is merely a "truism"); Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HAgv. L. REv. 84 (1985). Conversely,
the Court has limited federal power over individuals who do not enjoy the same procedural protections. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938) ("prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may ... curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and [thus]
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry"). See generally J.H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-183 (1980).
58. A similar argument is found in Ball, supra note 22, at 47 n.202, 50 n.219, 67-70.
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counted by the census in determining legislative apportionment
deliberately excluded Indians from the federal system." Reenact-

ment of this provision in 1867 by the fourteenth amendment 0
illustrated the continuation of this policy. In Elk v. Wilkins,6
an 18:84 decision denying Indians the right to vote, the Supreme
Court relied on this "not taxed" language to find that Indians
were not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 62 stating
further that Indians "owed immediate allegiance to their several

tribes,. and were not part of the people of the United States." ' 63

Indians were thus neither United States citizens nor citizens of
the states within which they might otherwise have been claimed

to reside.
It raight be argued that Indians are protected by the political

process because as citizens they are now able to vote. 4 However,

59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
3. ("Representatives ...shall be apportioned among

the several States

. .

.according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined

by ... the whole Number of free persons ...

and excluding Indians not taxes"). See

Newton, supra note 3, at 238-39.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each state, excluding Indians not taxed").
61. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
62. See id. at 99-103.
63. Id. at 99; see also McKay v. Campbell, 16 F. Cas. 161, 166-67 (D.Ore. 1871)
(No. 8,840). In 1870 the Senate Judiciary Committee also decided that Indians were not
subject to the United States' jurisdiction under the fourteenth amendment. S. Rep. No.
268, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 9-10 (1870). See also generally L. BARSH & J. HENDERSON,supra
note 7, at 62-74. However, the thirteenth amendment ("[n]either slavery nor involuntary
servitude . .. shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction," U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1), was held applicable to Alaskan Indians in In re
Sah Qua'h, 31 F. Supp. 327 (D. Alaska 1886), cited with approval in Metlakatla Indian
Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 51 (1962). In 1934 Sah Quah was cited by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs for the proposition that "those provisions of the Federal Constitution
which are completely general in scope, such as the Thirteenth Amendment, apply to members
of Indian tribes as well as to all other inhabitants of the nation." Powers of Indian Tribes,
55 Interior Dec. 14 (Oct. 25, 1934), reprinted in I OPINIONs OF Tim SOLICITOR 445, 451;
see also F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 665 nn.21-22; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 20, 33 (1883). The modem reconciliation of these conflicting jurisdictional interpretations has been the expansion of.fourteenth amendment protections to Indians through
the grant of citizenship. See, e.g., Goodluck v. Apache County, 417 F. Supp. 13 (D.
Ariz. 1975) (three judge court), aff'd without opinion sub nom Apache County v. United
States, 4.29 U.S. 876 (1976).
64. Indians formally received the right to vote when they gained citizenship, which
was granted to certain Indians under the General Allotment Act of 1887, §§ 5, 6, 24
Stat. 388, 389-90, and generally in 1924. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified
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citizenship and suffrage protect only individual rights, which
Indians theoretically enjoy equally with other American citizens.

Indian nations as nations, however, do not possess the political
process protections enjoyed by the states as states.6

Election

districts cut across tribal and reservation lines,66 and there are no
Indian delegations to Congress (and none, more importantly, to

the Senate). 7 Since Indian nations as political entities are powerless

within the American political system, the use of the Indian com-

merce clause as a means of justifying federal power over them
is illegitimate, and the analogy to the federal government's power

over interstate commerce used to support such an extension is inapposite. The only power which the Indian commerce claise

legitimately confers upon the federal government concerns the
regulation of "commerce." This power should be interpreted nar-

rowly in the Indian context, as it had been in early Supreme Court
and federal cases66 and by Congress, 69 all of which strictly limited

as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1982)). However, the reality of suffrage often did
not arrive until later. See, e.g., Porter v. Hall, 34 Ariz. 308, 271 P. 411 (1928), overruled,
Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P.2d 456 (1948); Allen v. Merrel, 6 Utah 2d. 32,
305 P.2d 490, vacated as moot, 353 U.S. 932 (1956).
65. See Newton, supra note 3, at 236-37. The Supreme Court has not taken up this
idea. Justice Stevens stated in 1987 that it is an "anomalous suggestion that the sovereignty
of an Indian tribe is in some respects greater than that of [a] State." Iowa Mutual Ins.
Co. v. La Plante, 107 S. Ct. 971, 980 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. See F. CoHEN, supra note 10, at 646 n.6. But see Klahr v. Williams, 339 F. Supp.
922, 927 (D. Ariz. 1972), enforcing Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108 (1971).
67. Such delegations were often proposed in early Indian treaties. See Comment, supra
2, at note 21 and accompanying text. For a more'recent proposal, see R. BARSH & J.
HENDERSON, supra note 7, at 281-82. The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the
Virgin Islands and American Samoa all send representatives to Congress who exercise
all the privileges of membership except voting. See 2 U.S.C. § 25a (1982), implementing
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXIII (District of Columbia); 48 U.S.C. § 891(b) (1982) (Puerto
Rico) 48 U.S.C. § 1711 (1982) (Guam and the Virgin Islands); 48 U.S.C. § 1731 (1982)
(American Samoa).
68. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886); United States v. Bailey,
24 F. Cas. 937, 939 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1834) (No. 14,495); United States v. Sa-Coo-Da-Cot
(Yellow Sun), 27 F. Cas. 923, 925 (C.C.D. Neb. 1870) (No. 16,212) (dictum) and cases
cited therein; Clinton, supra note 45, at 859; Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country:
A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN.
L. REv. 979, 996-1001 (1981).
69. In an 1834 Report of the Committee Regulating the Indian Department, it was
stated that "Congress expressly reserves the power ... to legislate over the Indian country,
so far as the Constitution requires them to do, viz. for the regulation of commerce with
the Indian tribes". H.R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1834) (emphasis added).
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federal power concerning Indian affairs to the regulation of com-

mercial intercourse. Significantly, in United States v. Kagama,7"

the case which provided the foundation for the broad modern

doctrine of plenary power, the Supreme Court explicitly denied
the use of the Indian commerce clause as a basis for federal
power, 7' rendering the clause
"superfluous as a source of power
' 72
over the Indian tribes.
Since the Indian nations are neither included in nor protected
by the national political process, it is the foreign commerce clause,
and not the interstate commerce clause, which provides the best
suggestion as to the proper reach of the Indian commerce clause.
By analogy to Congress' constitutional power over foreign com-

merce, the broadest constitutional interpretation of the Indian commerce clause would allow federal control only over commercial
interaction between United States citizens and Indians, and would
grant no power over the internal affairs of Indian nations. 7' The
exercise of federal power under this reading of the Indian commerce clause would resemble the familiar border and customs enforcement standards of interhational trade. 7 As in international
relations, United States jurisdiction could not reach into Indian
territory beyond the limits of power granted to the United States
by the Indian nations through the treaty-making process.7
70. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). See supra note 22.
71. 118 U.S. at 378-79.
72. THE CONSn'TION OF THE UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 282 (1973). A supplement to this document notes the Court's later contrary position regarding the Indian commerce clause. Id.,
S. Doc. No. 26, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. S22 (1978 Supp.) (discussing McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973)).
73. This was the interpretation of the clause in early American history. See, e.g.,
the Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790, 1 Stat. 136, of 1793, 1 Stat. 329, and of 1796,
I Stat. 469 (presuming to regulate only American conduct). See also F. Cohen, supra
note 10, at 212-13 nn.1-8 and accompanying text; F. Prucha, supra note 3, at 45-50.
74. This position was advocated by Justice McLean, both on the Supreme Court
bench, see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 592 (McLean, J., concurring),
and while riding circuit, see United States v. Cisna, 25 F. Cas. 422 (D. Ohio 1835) (No.
14,795). At the extreme, this power would permit the prohibition of commerce. See Regan
v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936). Whether such exercise would be consistent with the Indians' rights as citizens
seems doubtful, since such restrictions would probably violate modern equal protection
standards. Since Indians are citizens, singling them out of commerce prohibitions would
be a facially invalid action. However, any inconsistency would only serve to limit congressional power in deference to the Indians' rights. The problematic situation of Indian
American citizenship is discussed in Section III of this Article.
75. See R. BARsH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 7, at 59 n.35 and accompanying text;
Ball, supra note 22, at 47 n.202.
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The Treaty Power

The power of the United States to conclude treaties with the
Indians has been used as a justification for federal plenary authority
over Indian affairs in and of itself, in addition to and beyond
the specific terms of actual treaties.16 A prima facie argument
against such a contention is that since the United States formally
ended Indian treaty-making in 1871,"*the treaty power can no
longer confer power over the Indian nations on the federal government, even if it once could.7 8 Despite this argument, the use of
the treaty power as a constitutional foundation for plenary power
must be addressed. Many Indian treaties made prior to 1871 remain in force and provide sources of federal authority and responsibility, 9 and any consent-based model of United States-Indian
relations would require, if not formally denominated treaties,
agreements so similar that the limits of United States power concerning them need to be explored. This section argues that neither
the mere existence of the United States' power to make treaties
with Indian nations nor the terms of an actual treaty can confer
unenumerated powers on the federal government or authorize intrusions into internal Indian affairs unless such intrusions and
power are specifically delegated to the United States and permitted
by an Indian nation in a fairly negotiated treaty.
Historically, treaty-making was the dominant method of relation between the United States and Indian nations,"0 and most

76. "The Treaty Clause has been a principal foundation for federal power over Indian
affairs." F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 207. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973); Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S.
705, 715 (1943).
77. Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)). See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
78. See F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 208; Rice, The Position of the American Indian
in the Law of the United States, 16 Cois'. LEoIs. & INT'L L. (3d. ser.) 78, 83 (1934)
(In passing the 1871 Act Congress "struck down or admitted to be false the chief constitutiona basis of [federal] power [over Indians]"). The Supreme Court has held that
"[tihe change in no way affected Congress' plenary powers to legislate on problems of
Indians," Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203 (1975) (emphasis in original), but
did not refer to the treaty power or to any other constitutional provision as the source
of this legislative power, simply holding that the Court's own cases upheld such a reading.
See id. at 203-04.
79. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982). A major recent case premised upon treaty rights was
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), in which the Sioux Nation
recovered $105,000,000 for taking of their land in contravention of a treaty.
80. By 1871, the United States had entered into over 400 treaties with Indian nations.
See Institute for the Development of Indian Law, A Chronological List of Treaties and

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989

AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14

legislation concerning Indians was passed in order to carry out
the United States' treaty obligations.8 ' Indian treaties were drafted
and concluded according to international legal standards and were
considered by the United States to be agreements between independent sovereigns. 8" A treaty by an Indian nation granting concessions to the United States was seen as a delegation of sovereign
power, and all rights and powers not expressly delegated were held
to be "reserved" by the Indian nation. 3 As with foreign treaties,
Indian treaties were negotiated by the Executive and ratified by
the Senate.84 Indian treaties were, however, interpreted differently than international treaties by United States courts. Based on
"an acknowledgment of the [Indians'] unequal bargaining position,"8 5 treaty provisions were given the construction most sympathetic to the Indian parties.86 Despite these canons of construction, however, Congress has always held unquestioned power under
both international and United7 States law to abrogate treaties,
whether Indian or otherwise.

Agreements Made by Indian Tribes with the United States (1973). Marks v. United States,
161 U.S. 297, 302 (1896), puts the number at 666.
81. See Rice, Indian Rights: 25 U.S.C. § 71: The End of Indian Sovereignty or a
Self-L imitation of ContractualAbility?,5 AM. INDANr
L. R . 239, 239 (1977); F. Prucha,
supra rote 3, at 45.
82. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979). F. PRUCHA, supra note 3, at 142; R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON,
supra note 7, at 33; see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 548 (1832).
83. "[An Indian] treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights
from them-a reservation of those not granted." United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371,
381 (1905), quoted with approval, in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 327 n.24 (1978).
84. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
85. F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 222 (citing Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979)).
86. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1975) ("The canon of construction applied over a century and a half by this Court is that the wording of treaties
and statutes ratifying agreements with the Indians is not be be construed to their prejudice"); see also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970) (treaties are
to be interpreted as the Indians understood them); Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 675-76. See generally Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial
Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon
the Earth"--HowLong a Time is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601, 623-34 (1975). Federal
statutes concerning Indians are also interpreted sympathetically. See, e.g., Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62-65 (1978) (implication of private cause of action
from federal statute denied because it would conflict with policy of tribal self-government).
87. Under the international "last in time" rule, the most recent act of a nation, either
legislatively or by treaty, abrogates any prior inconsistent statutes or treaties. See The
Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889); L. Tribe,

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol14/iss2/2

1989]

AN ARGUMENT FOR NATIONHOOD

The only conceptual peculiarity about Indian treaty-making as
compared with foreign treaty-making is the 1871 Act mentioned

above, which purported to end treaty-making between the United
States and the Indian tribes. The Act grew out of a political power

struggle between the House of Representatives and Senate over
control of United States Indian policy. In 1871, the House, con-

stitutionally excluded from the treaty-making process, refused to
appropriate money for the fulfillment of treaty obligations unless

it received a greater role in formulating Indian policy." As a compromise designed to enable the House to participate, Congress

passed a rider to an Indian appropriations act prohibiting the
United States from further recognizing any Indian nation as capable
of making a treaty, though it did provide that existing treaties
would remain intact.8 9 The conduct of Indian policy, therefore,

would henceforth have to be accomplished legislatively, rather than
by treaty, and thus allowed the House a role in formulating Indian
policy. The negotiation of "Indian agreements," differing from
treaties only in that they were ratified by majority vote of both
Houses of Congress, continued as before, 90 but the agreements
were considered legislation, not treaties. Thus, while contractual

supra note 19, § 4-5 at 226, On the abrogation of Indian treaties, see United States v.
Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-40 (1986); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903);
Wilkinson and Volkman, supra note 86; Townsend, CongressionalAbrogation of Indian
Treaties: Reevaluation and Reform, 98 YALE L. J. 793 (1989).
88. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 202 (1974); Rice, supra note 81 at
notes 23-28 and accompanying text; L. Barsh & J. Henderson, supra note 7 at 67-69.
89. "No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom
the United States may contract by treaty; provided further that nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore
lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe,"
Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat, 544, 566 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (1982)); see Antoine, 420 U.S. at 201-04; Rice, supra note 81. It could be
argued that the 1871 Act nullified the Indians' power to treat with the United States.
However, the 1871 Act was a restraint on the executive branch and on the Senate, and
not on the Indian nations. While the Act for all practical purposes ended the treaty-making
power of the Indians, it formally only forbade the United States from recognizing Indian
tribes, and thus was only "a self-limitation of contractual ability." See Rice, supra note
81, at 243.
90. See American Indian Lawyer Training Program, MANU.L oF INDIAN LAw J-4
(3d ed. 1977); see also Rice, supra note 81, at 247; L. BARsH & J. HENmRsoN, supra
note 7, at 64 n.40.
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relations between Indian nations and the United States did not
cease, the 1871 Act did assert that Congress, and not the Executive,
now held primary authority for the conduct of Indian affairs."

This is not to say, however, that the fundamentally treaty-based
relationship between the Indians and the United States continued

unchanged. The arrogation by Congress of the President's power
to negotiate and conclude treaties embodied in the 1871 Act, while

practically only effecting a shift in the balance of power between
the House on one hand and the Senate and the President on the

other, had a significant effect on the relationship between the
United States and the Indian nations. Though it did not seem

to have been directly contemplated at the time, the shift from
treaties to legislation seems to have given Congress the impression that it could legislate over the Indians at will, and thus gave

rise to what has been known as the "plenary power era," a
decades-long period of expansive congressional legislation aimed
at assimilating Indians, breaking up tribes and acquiring Indian
lands. 92 As Barsh and Henderson note,
The most serious consequence of the [1871] compromise
amendment was never openly addressed. Treaties, like contracts,
are unenforceable except against those agreeing specifically and
expressly to be bound by them. Legislation, however, is

presumed to be legitimate when enacted, and enforceable against
all persons within the power of the legislature. Consent is neither

91. The 1871 Act arguably violated the separation of powers doctrine, for it eliminated
the constitutionally enumerated power of the Executive to conclude treaties by legislative
act, rather than by constitutional amendment. See Rice, supra note 81, at 246; L. BAgsH
& J. HENDERSON, supra note 7, at 68, 70. The Constitution also specifically grants to
the Executive the power to recognize foreign officials. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 3. Thus,
the Act potentially contravened not only the Executive's treaty-making powers under id.,
§ 2, but also its prerogative of recognition under id. § 3. Supporters of the 1871 Act
argued that they were only defining the term "foreign nation" as used in the Constitution. It. BAgsH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 7, at 68. By this, however, Congress was
arrogating to itself the power to interpret the meaning of a term in the Constitution,
an act -which is normally considered to be within the province of the judiciary, and thus
there is a further potential separation of powers violation. See id. While the Supreme
Court has discussed the Act several times, it has never questioned its constitutionality.
Id. at 70 n.47. Instead the Court has held that it "meant no more ... than that after
1871 relations with Indians would be governed by Acts of Congress and not by treaty."
Antoire v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203 (1974). See also Rice, supra note 81, at 246.
On the separation of powers doctrine generally, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
92. See Comment, supra note 2, at 529-35.
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specific nor express, but general and implied in the right to
vote."
While this change in the balance of power between the Indians
and the federal government, this shift from "negotiation with"
to "legislation over," was more pronounced at the time of the
Act's passage due to the Indians' lack of the franchise, the modem
extension of citizenship and the franchise to Indians has not
operated to restore the status quo ante of a consensual, treatybased relationship. Instead, it has simply assimilated the Indians
into a political process in which they are a numerical minority
unable to vindicate or protect their group rights to sovereignty
or property. The concept of consent has in fact been completely
emasculated, since there is no requirement that an Indian "agreement" be an agreement at all; Congress has assumed, and the
Supreme Court upheld, a congressional "plenary power" to
legislate over the Indians as it pleases. Indians need not be involved at all, except as the subjects of the legislation. Likewise,
the executive branch, the representative of the United States in
its relations with other sovereign entities, need not be involved
as negotiator, drafter, or in any other capacity; the President is
needed only to sign the final bill, and even in the case of a veto
she may be overridden.
The treaty power, though viewed after 1871 as involving both
Houses of Congress, has in modern times been cited as a source
of constitutional federal power over Indians in and of itself. 4 The
argument that the treaty power standing alone can confer power
over Indians, however, is specious, and proceeds solely from the
anomalous legal and political situation of the Indians. The treaty
power by itself certainly conveys no power to the United States
over citizens of other countries with which the United States treats.
The fact that it has been cited as a source of federal power over
Indians has been the result of the judiciary's need and attempt
to legitimate and "constitutionalize" the power the United States
has gained over the Indian nations through centuries of military,
political and economic exercises of force. 9" The only serious con-

BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 7, at 68-69.
94. See supra note 76.
95. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. For a description of the change
in the conception of Indian treaties from "formal instruments [which] bespoke relations
between equal sovereign political entities" to "instruments of American paternalism,"
see F. P. Prucha, supra note 2, at 15-19.

93. L.
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stitutional question which exists is whether the terms of a treaty
can convey, either explicitly or implicitly, unenumerated powers
upon the federal government.
The traditional understanding of the treaty power has been that
while its reach is broad and undefined, it remains subject to constitutional constraints.16 The Supreme Court did not consider the
precise constitutional restraints upon the treaty power until the
1920 case of Missouri v. Holland," an action brought by the State
of Missouri challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute
enacted to fulfill the provisions of an international agreement.
In dictum, Justice Holmes argued that the United States government held certain powers inherently as a sovereign, beyond the
explicit grants found in the Constitution, stating it was "not lightly
to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, 'a power
which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized
government' is not to be found."'" The Court found the statute
to be constitutional and thus recognized a federal power pursuant
to the treaty clause which existed outside of Congress' constitutionally enumerated powers.
The question of unenumerated congressional power pursuant
to the treaty power was next considered in the 1957 case of Reid
v. Covert.19 In that case, a four-Justice plurality seemed to contradict Holmes' dictum, holding that "[i]t would be manifestly
contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution,
•..

to construe [the supremacy clause] as permitting the United

States to exercise power under an international agreement without
observing constitutional prohibitions.""1 ' Justice Harlan, concurring in the result, provided the fifth vote on this point, writing

96. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). In the Indian context, The
Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-21, held that "[i]t need hardly be said
that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that

instrument."
97. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

98. Id. at 433 (quoting Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903)). A similar inherent power argument was made by the Kagama Court. See Comment, supra note 2,
at 528-29; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)

(executive power in foreign affairs is inherent). Holmes added that it was "obvious that
there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act
of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could." Missouri,
252 U.S. at 433.

99. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The case and its companions concerned with the applicability
of the Bill of Rights to American military trials in foreign countries.

100. Id. at 17 (plurality) (citation omitted).
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that "[tlo say that the validity of [a] statute may be rested upon
the inherent 'sovereign powers' of this country [is] no more than
begging the question."'' However, since the result in Reid was
based on the protections afforded to individuals by the Bill of
Rights, the Missouri v. Holland dictum that a state cannot present a justiciable claim that a treaty violates the Constitution is
apparently good law, 10 2 and was in fact adopted by the Reid plurality.'0 3 There is thus a dichotomy; the federal government cannot
rest an exercise of its power solely on the terms of a treaty where
such exercise contravenes the rights of United States citizens, but
a state cannot present a justiciable claim that an exercise of federal
power pursuant to a treaty contravenes its rights with the federal
system. The latter holding barring state claims is premised on the
protections afforded to the states in the national political process.0 4
Under the Reid holding, therefore, Indians as citizens are ostensibly protected by the Bill of Rights from the exercise of extraconstitutional power by Congress pursuant to a treaty or the treaty
power.0 5 The question that remains is whether federal plenary
power over Indian nations as nations can be justified on the basis
of treaties or the treaty power.
As with the commerce clause, the lack of participation by
Indians in the American political process0 6 renders illegitimate

101. Id. at 66 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). Lower federal courts have followed
the plurality's holding. See, e.g., Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Soucheray v. Corps of Eng'rs.,
483 F. Supp. 352, 357 (W.D. Wis. 1979). The reluctance of a majority of the Court to
join the plurality's holding is perhaps due to the fact that the case concerned military
court martials, and thus implicated Congress' power "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces," U.S. Co~sr. art. I, § 8,cl.14. Both
concurrences dealt with this clause at length. See 354 U.S. at 41-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); id. at 65-78 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
102. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); De Tenorio v. McGowan,
510 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1975).
103. "To the extent that the United States can validly make treaties, the people and
the States have delegated their power to the National Government and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 18 (plurality) (citing United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124-25 (1941)).
104. See id.; supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
105. There is thus a question as to whether the exercise by the United States of its
right to abrogate treaties can be found to be unconstitutional where the abrogation operates
in contravention of Indians' rights as citizens. Some protection has been afforded Indians
with regard to treaty-protected property. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,
348 U.S. 272, 278 n.9. (1955).
106. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989

AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14

any exercise of extraconstitutional power over them pursuant to
the treaty clause. While under the Missouri holding states may
have no justiciable claim for redress of such exercise, the Indian
nations' existence outside the federal system precludes the use of
such a nonjusticiability defense by the United States. It is thus
unconstitutional for the United States to imply any unenumerated
power from the text of a treaty'07 or to exercise any power over
an Indian nation pursuant to a treaty or the treaty clause which
was not granted by the Indian nation in treaty negotiations. The
latter idea is completely consistent with the stated rule of construction that all rights not expressly delegated by an Indian treaty
are "reserved" by the Indian nation." 8 In addition, the use of
sympathetic canons of construction for Indian treaties by the
United States courts further demonstrates the moral and constitutional command that neither Indian treaties themselves nor the
United States power to make them are to be construed as creating
federal power to the Indians' detriment.
Since the treaty clause cannot provide a source of extraconstitutional federal power over Indians, the only legitimate federal
actions regarding Indians under the clause in the absence of a
specific provision in a treaty delegating Indian power and permission 1:o the United States would be actions taken pursuant to one
of the federal government's other enumerated powers, such as
the appropriations power."0 9 For example, the federal government
would have the power to appropriate moneys pursuant to a treaty
agreement, but not to exercise unenumerated powers.
Congress' enumerated powers to conclude treaties with Indians
and to regulate commerce between citizens and Indians thus serve
only to grant to the federal government the authority necessary
to implement the United States' inter-sovereign relationship with
the Indians, as opposed to allowing such power to be exercised
by the states. Like the conduct of foreign affairs, the conduct
of Indian relations is thus a matter of federalism, of power as
divided between the federal and state governments, and is not a

107. While an argument could be made that the "necessary and proper" clause, U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18, might grant the United States power to fulfill the terms of
a treaty, cf. McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), such a reading would
contravene the doctrine of enumerated powers and in the Indians' case would be unchecked
by the political process. The argument should thus be rejected in the Indian context.
108. See supra notes 37 & 83.
109. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. I.
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question of power over Indian nations. Federal power over Indians
can extend only as far as an Indian nation's delegation of specific
powers to the federal government in a freely and fairly negotiated
treaty.110 The interaction between each Indian nation and the
United States should thus be similar to foreign relations, with each
party possessing its own goals, policies, history and record of dealings.I1 ' Indian affairs should, therefore, be conducted in a manner
analogous to the State Department's relationships with foreign
a function of the United States' power
nations, rather than' 1 as
2
over its "interior."
II.

The Trust Relationship

In the absence of any constitutionally sound basis for the broad
doctrine of federal plenary power over Indian nations, the only
permissible assertions of federal authority regarding Indians are
the regulation of commercial intercourse," 3 treaties, and constitutionally sound statutes passed to fulfill treaty provisions or to
regulate commerce." 4 Limiting the exercise of federal power to
constitutionally enumerated powers would recreate the historical
consent-based treaty relationship between the United States and

110. See R. BARsH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 7, at 59 ("Beyond specific grants
of tribal jurisdiction by treaty, Congress is limited to the regulation of 'commerce' ").
Many treaties included such delegations. See Comment, FederalPlenaryPower after Weeks
and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 235, 245 n.58 and accompanying text (1982). Whether
they were freely and fairly negotiated is another question. Before its recent repudiation,
see supra note 24 and accompanying text, the political question doctrine made it difficult
to question the fairness of treaty negotiations. See e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553 (1903).
111. This would be a return to the original conception of American-Indian relations
held by the Framers. "The early dominance of the Treaty Clause as a source of federal
authority illustrates that-at least during the first century of America's national existenceIndian affairs were more an aspect of military and foreign policy than a subject of domestic
or municipal law." F. Cohen, supra note 10, at 208 (footnotes omitted); see Comment,
supra note 2, at 514 nn.26-27 and accompanying text.
112. Responsibility within the federal government for dealing with Indians has been
handled by the Department of the Interior since 1849. Act of March 3, 1849, ch. 108,
§ 5, 9 Stat. 395, 395 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)). Prior to that, it was handled
by the War Department. Act of August 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 49, 50.
113. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 95-112 and accompanying text. Constitutionally sound statutes
would be those that concern only matters internal to the United States in regard to fulfilling its treaty obligations. Such statutes could exercise power over Indians only if a treaty
had delegated such power from an Indian nation to the United States.
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Indian nations as independent, self-determining powers, with the
only limitations on the Indian nations being those imposed upon
their external sovereignty as a necessary and negotiated result of
their geographical and political relationship with the United States.
An important aspect of such a relationship, and also of present
United States-Indian relations, is what is known as the "trust
responsibility."
A trust relationship is said to exist between the United States
and the Indians pursuant to treaties, statutes and Supreme Court
cases from which arise responsibility and power on the part of
the United States. Though the trust responsibility is often interpreted as itself creating extraconstitutional federal power over the
Indians, l 1 a properly reconceived trust relationship based solely
upon fair treaties and administered according to strict fiduciary
principles of private trust law would be both constitutional and
protective of Indian property and sovereignty. This section begins
by analyzing the development of the trust doctrine and its current
contours. It then considers the relationship of the trust responsibility to the exercise of federal power, and proposes a theory
of the trust doctrine which is consistent with both the federal
government's limited constitutional powers regarding Indians and
with the inherent sovereignty of Indian nations.
A.

The Nature and Source of the Trust Responsibility

The conception of Indians as wards or trust beneficiaries began
with Chief Justice Marshall's statement in 1831 in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia"6 that the relation of the Indian nations to the United
states "resembles that of a ward to his guardian."'1 7 Marshall

115. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943); United States
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886); F. Cohen, supra note 10, at 220 (the trust relation.

ship has been held to be a "separate and distinct basis for congressional power over
Indians"); Newton, supra note 3, at 232 (source of plenary power is the guardian-ward

relationship); Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 Htmv. L.
REv. 422, 436 n.71 (1984) ("plenary power derives from the trust doctrine") But see F.
Cohen, supra note 10, at 220 n.31 ("[t]he trust responsibility has not been cited as an
independent source of congressional power since United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S.
432 (1926)").
116. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
117. Id. at 17. Earlier assertion of guardianship over the Indians can be seen in F.
de Victoria, supra note 2, at 128 ("by defect of their nature they need to be ruled and
governed by others just as sons need to be subject to their parents," relying on Aristotle,
The Politics, bk. I).
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did not, however, indicate the source of the United States' guard-

ianship, nor its exact nature." ' The Court's explicit recognition

of the powers of autonomy and self-government possessed by the
Indians," 9 however, has been said to mean that "[i]n calling

Indians wards of the nation, Marshall's intention was not to limit
the tribes' autonomy, but to affirm the United States' duty to

protect it."2' It has also been argued that Marshall viewed the
guardianship as being founded upon treaties of friendship and

protection.' 2 '

The guardian-ward concept was further developed in 1886 in
United States v. Kagama.'2 2 There, the Supreme Court "recast

the Marshallian guardianship, treating it as a source of federal
power in addition to and apart from the express power in the
Constitution to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes."'' The
Court stated specifically that federal power over Indians arose
from the fact that "[t]hese Indian tribes are wards of the nation .... They are communities dependent on the United States
... From their very weakness and helplessness, . . . there arises
the duty of protection, and with it the power."' 2 4

Kagama and other plenary power era cases' 2 used the Indians'

status as "dependent wards" to justify broad powers assumed

by the federal government over Indians, though this was "frankly
acknowledged to be extraconstitutional."'

26

The duty of protec27

tion implied in a guardianship was seen as only a moral duty,

118. Note, supra note 115, at 424-25.
119. See 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16-17; Comment, supra note 2, at 518-19.
120. Note, supra, note 115, at 434-35 (footnote omitted). Certainly history has not
seen this principle upheld in practice.
121. See Chambers, JudicialEnforcement of the FederalTrust Responsibility to Indians,
27 STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1219 (1975) see also id. at 1220-21, 1246. In his position as Assistant Solicitor for Indian Affairs, Chambers in 1974 concluded that "the trust responsibility is basically derived from treaties with and statutes concerning the various Indians tribes,
and (after the treaty making power was limited by Congress in 1871) from later executive
orders and agreements with Indian tribes." Quoted in AIPRC, supra note 3, at 50-51.
122. 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
123. Chambers, supra note 121, at 1223. Chambers notes, however, that this is a possible
reading of Marshall's Cherokee Nation opinion. See id. at 1220-21.
124. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84 (emphasis in original).
125. See, e.g., Williams v. Johnson, 239 U.S. 414 (1915); Tiger v. Western Inv. Co.,
221 U.S. 286 (1910).
126. Newton, supra note 3, at 207.
127. See, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Beecher v. Wetherby, 95
U.S. 517, 525 (1877); Chambers, supra note 121, at 1227.
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and not as one which had any legal significance or enforceability.

Moreover, it was and has continued to be held that "it is settled
that the grant of citizenship to the Indians is not inconsistent with
their status as wards whose property is subject to the plenary con-

trol of the federal government,""12 and further that "[i]t rests
with Congress to determine when the guardianship shall cease."' 29
Unlike civil guardianship or custody cases, Indians cannot
demonstrate their individual competency and regain their rights
and property from the United States, their "trustee."'

30

In-

competency "is presumed from membership in an Indian tribe."'I'
More recently, however, the courts and the Congress have attempted to reconnect the trust responsibility to treaties and federal

statutes, rather than to a perceived racial or dependent status of
the Indians, and have begun to recognize legally enforceable obliga-

tions against the United States. 3 2 In United States v. Creek

Nation,' 33 one of the first cases to limit federal plenary power,
the Supreme Court held that allowing the government to confiscate

Indian lands recognized by treaty without paying just compensation " 'would not be an exercise of guardianship, but an act of
confiscation.' ,,'3, In the case of federal actions not implicating
treaties, the Court has found the trust responsibility to arise in
the form of an implied cause of action. In United States v. Mitchell

(Mitchell1),1"the Court held that " 'where the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervision over tribal monies

128. Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 718 (1943). See also Tiger v.
Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 310-16 (1911).
129. Seber, 318 U.S. at 718. See also United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 469
(1926). On the 1950s policy of "terminating" the federal-Indian relationship, see Comment,
supra note 2, at 533-34.
130. " '. . . the Indian ward never attains his majority .... generation after generation the Indian lives and dies a ward.' " F. P. Prucha, supra note 2, at 25 (quoting Report
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1901, in House Document No. 5, 57th Cong.,
1st Sess., serial 4290, at 4).

131. L. BA.sH & J.

HENDERSON,

supra note 7, at 93.

132. This transformation has been implemented by congressional waivers of soverign
immunity, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1982) and by judicial recognition of breach of
trust claims against the executive branch. See United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S.
103 (1935); Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923); Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa,
249 U.S. 110 (1919); Chambers, supra note 121, at 1230-32.
133. 2.95 U.S. 103 (1935).
134. d. at 110 (quoting Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919)).
See also Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 498 (1937) ("Spoliation is not
management.") (Cardozo, J.).
135. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
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or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally exists... even
though nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying
statute (or other fundamental document) about a trust fund, or
a trust or fiduciary connection.' "136
The Supreme Court has more generally held that "[t]here is

no doubt that the United States serves in a fiduciary capacity with
respect to [the] Indians and that, as such, it is duty bound to
exercise great care in administering its trust."' 3 7 Moreover, in
recognizing causes of action against the United States, courts have
broadly interpreted the trust doctrine to be "an incident of federal
recognition of any tribe. Thus it is not necessary to establish a
breach of a specific provision in a treaty, executive order, or statute
in order for the courts to find a federal liability to Indians."" '
Other cases have interpreted the trust responsibility to directly
limit congressional plenary power. In Morton v. Mancari'l9 the
Supreme Court held that legislation concerning Indians must be
"tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation
toward the Indians."'' Therefore, the trust responsibility apparently requires that federal "statutes be based on a determination that
the Indians will be protected." 1 4 ' Modern cases concerning the
trust doctrine have thus arguably returned to Marshall's notion
that "the basic guarantee of the United States was the territorial
and governmental integrity of the tribes."' 4 2 Such protection, in

136. Id. at 225, quoting Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 224 Ct. CI. 171,
183, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (1980). Mitchell II has been called a "significant tribal victory".
Barsh, supra note 5, at 886. The First Circuit in Joint Tribal Council of the Passamoquoddy
Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975), held that a trust relationship arose from
the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 137 (1790), which had codified the colonial
doctrine that Indians could not alienate land without the United States' consent. The court
held that this trust relationship required the United States to litigate the tribe's claim against
the State of Maine, which acquired title to tribal lands without federal consent. 528 F.2d
at 379-80. The case was later settled by the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980,
Pub. L. 96-420, 94 Stat. 1785 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1721 (1982)).
137. United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973) (citing Seminole Nation v.
United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942)); see also Chambers, supra note 121, at 1213
n.1 and cases cited therein.
138. American Indian Lawyer Training Program, supra note 90, at J-8; see also
Chambers, supra note 121, at 1215, 1247.
139. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
140. Id. at 555. This standard was restated in Delaware Tribal Business Committee
v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977).
141. F. CoHEN, supra note 10, at 221.
142. Chambers, supra note 121, at 1246; see also Note, supra note 115, at 423 ("development of a coherent trust doctrine ... requires a principle of respect for the tribes' right
to substantial self-government") (footnote omitted)
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Marshall's view, was not paternalistic but rather the protection
by consent of a weaker power by a stronger one, a political relationship of which many examples existed in contemporary foreign
43
affairs.
Despite its ad hoc judicial origin in Cherokee Nation'4 4 and
its later development under theories of dependency and inferiority, 145 the modern trust doctrine has come to require that "where
the federal government manages Indian property under congressional authority, a trust relationship presumptively exists."1' 46 This
trust relationship imposes fiduciary duties upon the federal government in its conduct regarding Indians, and under Mancari conceivably requires that federal power be exercised only in the
Indians' interest. The Supreme Court, however, has not coherently
reformulated its conception of the trust relationship. What is
necessary is a clear-cut acknowledgment that the traditional, ad
hoc, judicially-created idea of a paternalistic guardian-ward trust
relationship is no longer valid, and a recognition of the growing
trend in the law to find the United States subject to traditional,
common-law standards of fiduciary obligation and constructive
trust in its management of Indian property.
B.

The Trust Relationship and Plenary Power

Throughout the history of United States-Indian relations, there
has been a conflict of interest between the duties the United States
has undertaken toward Indians, whether morally or legally imposed, and the exercise of its political, military and legal power
over the Indians in the various guises of discoverer, conqueror
and guardian. This conflict is crystallized in the tension between
the federal government's fiduciary duties under the trust responsibility and its exercise of broad legislative power under the plenary
47
power doctrine.

143. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832); see also United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). However, in return for such protection the
Indians' surrendered certain of their rights of external sovereignty. See supra notes 4 & 28.
144. See F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 220 (the "federal trust responsibility to Indians
evolved judicially").
145. See Note, supra note 115, at 426-27.
146. Note, Indians May Sue for Breach of Federal Trust Relationship: United States
v. Mitchell, 26 B.C. L. REv. 809, 842 (1985).
147. See F. CoHEN, supra note 10, at 207.
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The Supreme Court addressed this tension in United States v.
Sioux Nation,'48 a case involving the taking of treaty-protected
property.' 49 The Court's solution was to state that " 'Congress
can own two hats, but it cannot wear them both at the same
time,' ,,1SO and further that the determination of the capacity in
which Congress was acting in any given situation was a question
of fact.' 5 ' A finding that Congress was acting as a trustee depended
on whether the particular measure enacted "was appropriate for
protecting and advancing the tribe's interests.""5 2 As regarded the
taking of property, if the action was found to be so appropriate
it would not be subject to "the constitutional command of the
Just Compensation Clause."' Congress would, however, remain
" 'subject to limitations inherent in ... a guardianship and to
[other] pertinent constitutional restrictions," 54 the substance of
which the Court did not elaborate. On the other hand, if Congress was found to have acted pursuant to its eminent domain
power, just compensation would have to be paid.' 55 The Court
held that although there was no longer a "presumption of congressional good faith,"' 56 proof of Congress' good faith in seeking to advance tribal interests would be sufficient to qualify its

148. 448 U.S. 371 (1980). For commentary, see Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth
Amendment Takings of Indian Land: An Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule, 61 OR. L.
REv. 245 (1982); Hanson, Special Recent Development: United States v. Sioux Nation:
Political Questions, Moral Imperative, and the National Honor, 8 AM. I'Dm L. REv.
459 (1980). Earlier consideration of the question can be seen in the Court of Claims'
decision in Sioux Nation, 601 F.2d 1157 (Ct. Cl. 1979), and in Three Tribes of Fort Berthold
Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 691-94 (Ct. Cl, 1968).
149. 448 U.S. at 415. Under Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 277-78
(1955), just compensation must be paid for the taking of such property. On the basis
of the plenary power doctrine, however, it has been held that property not guaranteed
to Indians by treaty may be disposed of by the federal government without just
compensation.
150. 448 U.S. at 408 (quoting Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation, 390 F.2d
at 691).
151. Id. at 416.
152. Id. at 415.
153. Id.
154. Id. (quoting United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1935)).
155. 448 U.S. at 415 n.29.
156. Id. at 416; see also id. at 410-15. The presumption of congressional good faith
extinguished by the Sioux Nation Court originated in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553, 568 (1903).
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actions as that of a trustee." 7 It would not be necessary to prove
that the measure was in fact the best option open to Congress
in pursuing the tribes' welfare.
The Sioux Nation standard of deferring to congressional judgment as to the interests of Indians has been strongly criticized
as insufficiently protective of Indian rights and violative of Indian
sovereignty.158 One commentator states that "[a]lthough the fifth
amendment requires Congress to pay just compensation to all other
Americans, the good faith effort test creates a special exemption
for Indians." ' 51 9 A further criticism of the Sioux Nation rule is
that a "good faith" standard is much less stringent than the
fiduciary obligations required by the Court's other cases, and also
less stringent than the "rationally tied" standard set forth in
Mancari.The Sioux Nation standard also would freely permit post
hoc characterizations of Congress' actions regarding Indians as
having been done in the Indians' interests.
Despite these criticisms, and despite the fact that Sioux Nation
addressed only the narrow balance between the United States'
responsibilities as a trustee over Indian lands and its powers of
eminent domain, the Court's analysis is susceptible to a much
broader application. 60 In holding that Congress cannot wear "two
hats" simultaneously, the Court provided a framework for examiniag the fundamental tension in American Indian law between
the United States' fiduciary duties under the trust responsibility
and the powers Congress has arrogated to itself pursuant to the
plenary power doctrine.' 6 ' This framework provides a point of
departure for reconceiving the trust relationship in light of the
strict constitutional limits on plenary power demonstrated above.

157. Cases applying this good faith standard include Confederated Salish and Kootenai

Tribes v. United States, 437 F.2d 458, 459-60 (Ct. C1. 1971); Klamath and Modoc Tribes
v. United States, 436 F.2d 1008, 1015 (Ct. CI. 1971).
158. See Newton, supra note 148, at 260-65; Hanson, supra note 148, at 482-83;
Comment, supra note 110, at 259.
159. Newton, supra note 148, at 261. The Court specifically stated that while "there
is no doubt that the Black Hills were 'taken' from the Sioux in a way that wholly deprived
them of their property rights," a determination that the federal government was acting
"pursuant to its unique powers to manage and control tribal property" would render
the just compensation clause inapplicable. 448 U.S. at 409 n.26; see also Comment, supra
note 110, at 265.

160. Other commentators have similarly asserted that "[t]here is no principled reason
to confine [the Sioux Nation analysis] to takings cases." Comment, supra note 110, at 255.
161. This idea was first suggested by Comment, supra note 110.
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On one side of the balance is the federal government's legislative
and executive power under the plenary power doctrine. This article has argued, however, that this broad plenary power is wholly
without constitutional support and that the enumerated powers
of the federal government regarding Indians encompass only the
regulation of commerce and the negotiation of treaties. These constitutional limits on federal power in the conduct of the United
States' relations with Indian nations reveal the complete lack of
legal, constitutional support for the exercise of federal plenary
power over the internal affairs and territory of Indian nations.
The first alleged constitutional basis for plenary power, the Indian
commerce clause, in actuality provides only for the regulation of
the citizens and states of the United States in their interaction
with Indian nations, just as the foreign commerce clause controls
the field of foreign affairs and trade. Federal authority under the
treaty power, the second alleged basis for plenary power, is constitutionally confined within the bounds of the government's other
enumerated powers. The only case in which a treaty could provide the federal government with power not enumerated in the
Constitution would be one where a sovereign nation, Indian or
otherwise, delegated to the United States certain of its national
powers. 6 2 The scope of federal power regarding Indians is therefore
small, and constitutionally presupposes a treaty-like consensual
relationship. The constraints imposed by the Constitution and the
inherent sovereignty of Indian nations forbid the exercise of federal
control over Indian peoples without their consent.
On the other side of the balance, the federal government is a
trustee, albeit often self-imposed, over Indian lands and assets.
This trust relationship should be narrowly drawn to exist only
where explicitly provided for in treaties. Indian lands and assets
currently held by the federal government which were never formally conveyed in a treaty by the Indians must either be returned
to them or a treaty must be negotiated to create a strict fiduciary
trust relationship. In addition, a constructive trust should be imposed upon the United States in any situation where it undertakes to control Indian land, natural resources, or other assets,
as was recognized in Mitchell I.1 63 This constructive trust would

162. Delegation of sovereign powers by an Indian nation in trust to the United States

pursuant to treaties or other agreements would confer power upon the United States, but
the source of such power would be the Indians' own sovereignty.
163. 463 U.S. 206 (1983). See supra notes 135-36, 138, 146 and accompanying text.
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remain in force until the property is formally conveyed in a treaty
by the Indians to the United States, either in trust or in fee, or
is returned to the Indian nations. Similarly, the ability of the federal
government to escape the just compensation clause regarding Indian
lands upheld in Tee-Hit-Ton should be abolished, and legal title
to all Indian lands, either in fee or under trust, should be recognized
as belonging to the various Indian nations.
Along with the full recognition of Indian property rights, there
should be no federal assertion of power over Indian property
beyond the traditional bounds of the eminent domain power and
the proper powers of a trustee. Regarding the latter, the United
States should be held to the strictest of fiduciary duties in its control and management of Indian land and resources, 6 4 and Indians
should have an effective voice in the administration of their property. The "trust responsibility" would therefore no longer be a
unitary source or doctrine of power over Indians, but rather a
broad term encompassing all the various means of fulfilling the
obligations and duties the United States has undertaken and the
powers it has received through treaties. The intention of the trust
responsibility should be to return land and assets held in trust
to the Indians as soon as economically and politically feasible.
The term "trust responsibility" should remain in usage only to
point out the one cardinal difference between the United States'
relationship with sovereign Indian nations and its relationships
with foreign nations: that because of the United States' egregious
history of treatment of the Indians, it should be bound to exercise a duty of care and loyalty in its relations with Indians which
goes beyond that accorded other foreign nations.
Recognition of the limited constitutional powers of the federal
government and of the Indians' rights to sovereignty and full
ownership of their lands would create a large vacuum in United
States-Indian relations where federal power currently encroaches
on Indian autonomy and territory. This vacuum should be filled
by the rightful and original sovereignty of the Indian nations, and

164. As is ostensibly the current state of the law. See supra notes 132-46 and accompanying text; F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 225 ("the federal trust responsibility imposes
strict fiduciary standards on the conduct of executive agencies"); see generally id. at 225-28.

The doctrine of plenary power has barred breach of trust claims or other enforcement
of the fiduciary responsibility against Congress itself, see id., except where by statute
Congress has waived its immunity. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1982). However, recognition of the plenary power doctrine's lack of constitutiogal foundation would remove this bar.
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United States-Indian relations should return to a contractual, consensual and treaty-like relationship. Past treaties between the
Indians and the federal government, long subject to abrogation
by the United States, should be recognized as being subject to
abrogation by either party, thus providing a context for their
bilateral renegotiation. Political considerations, international attention, and common morality should prohibit the United States
from attempting to reassert the powers it once exercised under
the plenary power doctrine, and Indians' newly recaptured
sovereignty would be a spur to their political and economic advancement as independent nations.
A properly conceived trust relationship, based solely upon
treaties and mutual agreements and administered according to strict
fiduciary principles, would thus provide a framework of federalIndian relations which conforms with the constitutional limits on
federal power and which would reinstate both the inherent
sovereignty of Indian nations and their original consent-based relationship with the United States. Adoption of these principles would
fulfill the Framers' constitutional design for United States-Indian
relations and would re-empower the Indian nations.
III.

The Problem of Citizenship

Recognition of the sovereign Indian nationhood advocated in
the previous sections would put the Indian nations in a "government to government," 6 consensual, treaty relationship with the
United States, and also with the several states through the mediation of the federal government. A problem which would be created
by the implementation of such a conception of the Indian tribes
as nations is the problem of Indian citizenship. This problem is
rooted in the reality discussed above with regard to the national
political process: that the focus of modern United States politics
is on the individual rather than on the states or other mediating
bodies such as the Electoral College, as was originally provided
in the Constitution. 166 Thus, a conception of the Indian nations
as nations, as possessing "a status higher than states," 16 7 or even

165. This phrase is an important slogan for Indian advocates, see V. DELoRIA, JR.,
& C. LYTrTm,

TIE NATIONS

,Vwm

:

TnE PAST AND FuTuRE oF AMERicAN INDLAN

SovERIaNTY 259-60 (1984), and has been adopted by the United States. See President
Reagan, Statement of Indian Policy, quoted supra note 10.
166. See supra notes 48-57, 102-05 and accompanying text.
167. V. DELORIA, JR., & C. L=rrT,
supra note 165, at 1.
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as deserving treatment at least equal to that of the states within

the federal system' 68 does not substantially address the problem
of defining a political status for the individual Indian American.
The plenary power doctrine has given the federal government broad
power to directly legislate over the lives of United States citizens, 16 9

and the full naturalization and enfranchisement of all American
Indians in 1924170 places Indians in the same "one person, one

vote" relation to the federal government as other citizens. '7 ' Thus

a disaffiliation of an Indian Nation from the American body politic
and a recognition of its nationhood would leave substantial questions open as to the nationality, citizenship, allegiances, rights and
privileges of its individual Indian members.
A.

Dual Nationality

Some of these problems could be easily dealt with by reference
to the traditional concepts of "dual nationality" or "dual citizenship". In 1952 the Supreme Court stated that dual nationality
is "a. status long recognized in the law, 1"72 and further that "[t]he

concept of dual citizenship recognizes that a person may have and
exercise rights of nationality in two countries and be subject to
the responsibilities of both. The mere fact that [one] asserts the
rights of one citizenship does not without move mean that he renounces the other.' ' 71 Dual nationality is, however, limited by
the similarly "recognized fact of international law that a dual national is never entitled to invoke the protection or assistance of
one of the two countries while within the other country."

74

This

168. See L. BARSH & J. HENDERsON, supra note 7, at 258-60 ("Congress should read
the words 'or tribes' into the Constitution's references to 'states.' " Id. at 260.).
169. See supra notes 47, 56-57 and accompanying text.
170. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b) (1982)).
171. At least in theory. But see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
172. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 723 (1952) (citing numerous cases and
secondary sources). See also Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 344 (1939); Comment, Dual
Nationality and the Problem of Expatriation, 16 U. SAN FRANcisco L. REV. 291, 293 (1982).
173. Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 723-24. See also Comment, supra note 172, at 313 (discussing
the 1930 Hague Conference on Certain Questions Relating to Conflict of Nationality Laws,
at which the validity of dual nationality was recognized. Though the United States was
not a signatory to the 1930 Hague Codification Conference Convention which resulted
from the Conference, it has nonetheless followed the principles put forth in that document. Id. at 314).
174. United States v. Matheson, 400 F. Supp. 1241, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 532
F.2d 809 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823, citing Nishikawa v. United States, 356 U.S.
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latter principle is in theory applied analogously to the relation-

ship between Indian tribes and tribal members on their reservations (i.e., within "Indian country") and the governments of the
surrounding states of which they are also citizens, in that the laws
and jurisdiction of tribes and of the states are in no way concurrent but in fact mutually exclusive except where provided by a
treaty properly consented to by the federal government.'7 5 Its ap-

plication in a federal/Indian context following the recognition of
Indian nationhood should thus not be problematic because of Congress' and the judiciary's acquaintance with such principles.
However, any recognition of Indian nationhood would need to
be accompanied by clear territorial demarcations, as in foreign
relations generally, and the adoption of accepted (or perhaps
specially modified)
principles of international conflict of laws
76
doctrine.'
Every nation has the right under international law to create
its own conditions for citizenship and nationality. 77 This right
has been similarly recognized by the Supreme Court as belonging
to American Indian tribes with regard to determining conditions
78
for membership in a tribe. In Santa ClaraPueblo v. Martinez
the Court held that neither the Constitution nor the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 7 9 the latter of which had on the basis of congres-

129, 132 (1958) and Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 733. By analogous reasoning, it was only when
Congress enacted and imposed the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302
(1982), upon Indian tribes that the constitutional protections set out in the Bill of Rights
were afforded to Indian defendants before Indian courts. Prior to 1968, an Indian could
not invoke fifth amendment or other constitutional privileges and protections in a tribal
tribunal.
In Matheson the principle was invoked to hold that a declaration to the government
of Mexico by an American citizen renouncing the protection of foreign (i.e., American)
laws against Mexican laws and authorities did not operate as a renunciation of American
citizenship because the declarant already believed herself to be a Mexican national by
marriage. Thus, under the principle at issue her declaration was redundant as a matter
of international law and thus could not serve to show a willful act of expatriation.
175. This principle, a function of the commerce and supremacy clauses of the Constitution, has been greatly eroded in the twentieth century by Supreme Court case law.
See supra notes 4, 41-43; Comment, supra note 2, at 556-86.
176. This article will not address these issues of territorial demarcation or conflict
of law rules because they are uncontroversial from a constitutional standpoint and are
primarily political questions. The Marshall Court cases recognizing Indian sovereignty were
essentially geographically determinate in their analysis of Indian and United States powers.
See Canby, supra note 4, at 4.
177. See Comment, supra note 172, at 294.
178. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
179. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982).
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sional plenary power imposed the provisions of the Bill of Rights
upon the operation of tribal governments, provided a remedy for
an individual Indian's otherwise primafacie case of an equal protection violation against her tribe for denying her children membership in the tribe. The Court grounded its decision on the tribe's
power (and more importantly but not correctly, Congress' recognition of the tribe's power) to determine its own membership.
Requirements for citizenship vary from country to country, but
"[tihe two most common ways of acquiring nationality are by
birth in a country which confers nationality by jus soli, right of
the soil, or by birth of parents whose nationaltiy [sic] is conferred
upon their children byjus sanguinis, right of blood."' 8 The United
States confers citizenship on the basis of both of these principles,"'
and thus under current United States law American Indians qualify
as citizens by both soil and blood. However, some Indians and
some tribes have never conceded nor accepted that they are United
States citizens by any means."'
The official position of the United States is to discourage dual
nationality," 3 and it neither recognizes nor approves it but "accepts it 'as the result of separate conflicting laws of other countries.' "I" The United States, however, once granting citizenship
to an Indian, by birth or otherwise, has long recognized and never
challenged such Indian's right and ability to be both a citizen and
a member of his or her tribe." ' Thus, none of the general and
internationally accepted principles described above concerning dual
citizenship would in any material way act in derogation of dual

181). Comment, supra note 172, at 294.
181. Id., citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (jus sol); United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U-S. 649 (1898) (same); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)-(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (jussanguinis).
Up until the inclusion in 1924 of American Indians in what is currently 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b),
Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, Indians had been held to be outside the reach
of the fourteenth amendment's grant of citizenship. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying
text; L. BARsH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 7, at 67-74.
182. See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
183. Comment, supra note 172, at 295.
184. Comment, supra note 172, at 295 (quoting Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1184
(7th Cir. 1980)).
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1982), in granting citizenship to members of an "Indian,
Eskimo, Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe," provides that "the granting of citizenship
under this subsection shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of such
person to tribal or other property." Respect for tribal citizenship has not, however, prevented
the United States' periodic and strenuous attempts aimed at assimilating American Indians.
See Comment, supra note 2, at 529-34.
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Indian/American citizenship should the Indian nations be accorded
sovereign recognition.' s
The only substantial problems Indian nationhood would pose
for American Indian citizens under current United States law would
arise from the United States' expatriation statute.' 8 7 The provisions of the statute operate to revoke the citizenship of any citizen,
and thus any Indian, who "voluntarily. . . with the intention of
relinquishing United States nationality:-""'
accept[ed], serv[ed] in, or perform[ed] the duties of any office,
post or employment under the government of a foreign state
or a political subdivision thereof, if he has or acquires the nationality of such foreign state; or for which office, post, or
employment an oath, affirmation or declaration of allegiance
is required.' 8 9
Conceivably, this provision could operate to denationalize any
Indian American who undertook public or civil service in his or
her newly recognized nation. Other provisions of the statute which
trigger denationalization, such as service in the armed forces of

186. It has been written, however, that the "United States' adherence to the international process and laws in the resolution of problems of dual nationality has been equivocal."
Comment, supra note 172, at 314. The United States rejected the signing of the 1930
Hague Convention, see supra note 173, holding that a " 'principle of election' " should
have been included, under which a dual national would, after age 23, " 'be conclusively
presumed to have elected the nationality' " of the state in which he "has his habitual
residence." Comment, supra note 172, at 314 n.137 (citations omitted). However, the
United States has signed several other international agreements concerning dual nationality and has presented cases concerning dual nationality to international tribunals designed
to deal with such issues, and thereby has both explicitly and implicitly accepted international norms concerning dual nationality. Id. at 314-15. While a vigorous United States
position against dual Indian/American nationality could prevent the recognition of Indian
sovereignty, such a position would place the United States in conflict with both the invulnerable right of every American citizen to remain a citizen, see Afroyism v. Rusk,
387 U.S. 253 (1967), and the constitutional presupposition and requirement of the recognition
of Indian sovereignty posited in this Article, whereas acceptance of dual nationality in
the case of Indians would reconcile these positions.
187. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For a brief history of United States
expatriation laws, see Comment, supra note 172, at 296-300.
188. This introductory language was added on Nov. 14, 1986, by Pub. L. 99-653,
§§ 18, 19, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AammN. NEws (100 Stat.) 3655, 3658, apparently
in order to codify the holding in Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980), in which the
Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment and prior case law required a finding
of specific intent to relinquish citizenship.
189. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4) (1982).
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a foreign state,' 90 voluntary naturalization in a foreign state, 9 '
or "taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal
declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof,"'' 92 could likewise serve to denationalize a dual
Indian/American citizen of his or her United States citizenship.
The requirement that the enumerated acts of expatriation must
be done "voluntarily" and "with the intention of relinquishing
United States nationality," however, would seem to work to
preserve the United States citizenship of any dual Indian/American
national who committed an otherwise expatriating act without the
requisite intention of renouncing his or her United States citizenship. 193 While the statute does provide that once the fact of the
performance of an expatriating act is proven by a preponderance
of the evidence by the one asserting the loss of citizenship (i.e.,
the government), there is then a rebuttable presumption that the
act was done voluntarily. 9 An Indian American performing a
potentially expatriating act, such as serving in a tribal office, would
in all likelihood be doing so voluntarily anyway. The need for
the government to prove specific intent to renounce citizenship,
however, would continue to work to preserve the Indian's dual
nationality. There is, of course, the danger that the statute could
serve to put an Indian American who commits an alleged act of
expatriation in a public manner, such as holding a tribal post or
office, continually on the defensive in attempting to retain citizenship should the United States become aggressive in prosecuting
dual Indian American nationals for expatriation. Such a threat
of expatriation could become a powerful tool by which the United
States could gain leverage and acquire influence over independent
tribal leaders, and could, therefore, serve to undo any of the
benefits Indian nationhood would create for the Indians.
The only solution to this potential problem of harassment

190. Id. at § 1481(a)(3).
191. Id. at § 1481(a)(1).
192. Id. at § 1481(a)(2).
1931. See Richards v. Secretary of State, Dep't of State, 752 F.2d 1413, 1418-22 (9th
Cir. 1985); Kahane v. Shultz, 653 F. Supp. 1486 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (American citizen's

election to and assumption of seat in Israeli Knesset was an expatriating act but did not
serve to expatriate him because he manifested no intent to relinquish his American
citizenship).
194. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c). "There is no presumption, however, that the expatriating
act was performed with the intent to relinquish citizenship." Richards, 752 F.2d at 1418,
citing Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 268.
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through aggressive attempts to expatriate Indians by the United
States would be to ensure that the implementation of nationhood
for a tribe be accomplished by means of a clear treaty agreement
between the tribe and the United States, and perhaps also a concurrent congressional statute. These would codify an understanding of what actions and intentions are required to be proven
and what standard of proof is necessary in order for an Indian
to expatriate or be expatriated, and likewise what actions would
be exempt from forming the basis of an expatriation action. Implementation of a broad program of recognizing Indian nationhood
would in the interest of efficiency and practicality require the creation of a statutory exemption from the expatriation statute for
dual Indian American nationals who wish to retain their United
States citizenship yet also wish to serve their new Indian nations
through otherwise expatriating acts.
The best means of establishing the citizenship status of Indians
upon the recognition of a tribe's sovereign status would be to
have the members of the tribe decide for themselves what manner
of citizenship they wish to hold-dual United States/tribal citizenship or exclusive citizenship in one of the two. Such decisions
should then be recognized by the United States. The United States
and the tribe should also decide what presumption is to exist for
children and the as yet unborn. There are many possibilities involved, given the varying statuses a child's parents may hold and
the problem of children of unknown parentage. The technicalities
of such arrangements, however, are not important to this article,
as they have been fully worked out by various immigration and
nationality statutes, regulations and court decisions over the years
concerning foreign nations and citizens generally.
There is, however, one way in which Indian nationhood could
be seen as different than foreign statehood in the context of the
citizenship of newborns. If an Indian child's parents had completely and effectively renounced all citizenship and other ties to
the United States, and indeed if the child's whole tribe had declared
and had accepted its independence from the United States, could
such a child still lay a claim to United States citizenship, based
perhaps on jus soli (the right of the soil)? A child born in France
of purely French parents has no such claim; would a child born
in an independent Indian nation? A practical solution would be
to hold that while a minor, such child should hold the same status
his parents held or chose. Upon reaching maturity, the best option would be for the child to have the right to choose his or
her own status, whether it be dual or exclusive. The United States,
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however, may not wish to grant such easy naturalization upon
maturity to a person who was an alien while a minor. Such a
right of election could be negotiated for and codified in the treaty
establishing an Indian nation's independence. This, however, is
a question of policy for the United States. Moreover, while a persuasive moral argument could be made that every Indian child
should have a right to United States citizenship, the question is
really up to the child's people to answer. If they seek a nationhood
completely independent from the United States with no ties of
dual citizenship, then that is their choice for their future and for
their children. Such children could always seek to naturalize, and
the United States would presumably be and should be liberal in
naturalizing independent Indians.
The last problem posed by these issues of citizenship is the converse of the one above. If a child is of Indian descent but his
parents have severed all ties of citizenship with their tribe or tribes,
can the child acquire Indian citizenship? At first blush, this is
an easy issue, for the answer is to leave it to tribal policy, something
which the United States should have no hand in. However, a problem arises if the tribe does allow the child to become a member
and if the child does in fact become a member. The problem is
that United States law holds that voluntary acquisition of a second nationality can constitute grounds for expatriation,1 91 and thus
the Indian child's actions might form the basis for an action to
denafionalize him. While this problem of voluntarily acquiring
dual citizenship was once a fairly large concern for Americans
who lived, worked or were educated abroad,' 96 the Supreme Court
held in 1980 in Vance v. Terrazas'" that specific intent to relinquish United States citizenship is necessary in addition to proof
of a voluntary act of expatriation in order to denationalize an
American citizen. This, and the subsequent statutory codification
of the court's intent requirement,' 98 would work to preserve the
United States citizenship of such Indian child despite his naturalization into a tribe so long as he did not manifest a specific intent
to renounce that citizenship. The tribe perhaps could accommodate
this situation by providing in whatever ceremony or document

195. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(1), (2) (1982); See also Comment, supra note 172.
196. See Comment, supra note 172, at 292.
197. 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
198. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1968); see supra note 188.
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it may require to naturalize such a child that the child by doing
so does not renounce United States citizenship. 199
B.

Between Citizen and Alien
A question could be raised as to whether there are any inter-

mediate categories of nationality between alienage and full citizenship under existing law which might be useful in defining a political
status for members of sovereign American Indian nations. The
United States Code does provide for the status of "national of

the United States,

' 20 0

which is defined to mean either a citizen

or "a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes

permanent allegiance to the United States." 2

"Permanent

allegiance" is not defined in the Code, but case law generally

defines it as an obligation of fidelity and obedience to a government. 22 Persons who are nationals, but not citizens, of the United
States "at birth ' 20 3 include those born in the "outlying
possessions '

24

of the United States and the children of nationals,

subject to certain conditions.20
The problem which exists is that no truly functional definition
of "national" seems to exist, other than that it is a category of
persons owing allegiance to the United States which is somehow

broader than the category of citizens.20 6 A 1985 unpublished opinion from the Sixth Circuit 2 7 illustrates the confusion surrounding

199. Another way out of this problem would be based on the holding in United States
v. Matheson, 400 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 809 (1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 823, discussed supra at note 174. If by making such a child a citizen the tribe
was only affirming a preexisting citizenship, rather than creating a new one, then an act
of allegiance to the tribe performed by the child to obtain such affirmance, like the declaration in Matheson, would be redundant and thus could not serve as an expatriating act.
200. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(21), 1408 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
201. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21) (1982).
202. See Cabebe v. Acheson, 183 F.2d 795, 797 (9th Cir. 1950) (" 'Nationality' is
... a relationship ... 'involving the duty of obedience [or 'allegiance'] on the part of
the subject and protection on the part of the state.' "); 3A Am. Jtr. 2d § 1455 n.47
(1986 and 1987 Supp.) and cases cited therein.
203. 8 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982).
204. Defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29) (1982) as including only "American Samoa
and Swains Island."
205. See 8 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
206. See Brassert v. Biddle, 59 F. Supp. 457, 462 (D. Conn. 1944).
207. United States v. Salem, 762 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1985), aff'g without published
(N.D. Ohio 1984) (opinion available on LEXIS, Genfed Library,
F. Supp. opinion Courts file).
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the term. The defendant, a resident alien, was convicted of
fraudulently obtaining student loans by checking a box on a form
indicating that he was either a citizen or a national. His conviction was upheld, but the majority opinion dealt primarily with
the allegation that the defendant claimed to be a citizen. The
dissent, however, argued that the majority "ignore[d] the alternative phrasing of the question asked of [the defendant, for he]
may well have thought he was a 'national' even if he knew he
was not a United States citizen. 20 8 The dissent noted that "the
Assistant U.S. Attorney at oral argument, like the two government witnesses at trial, could not give a definition of the term,
'national,' ,,209 and concluded that "because of the vagueness of
the meaning of the term 'national,' and because of lack of evidence
establishing the meaning
of the term, ... I would accordingly
'21
reverse the conviction.
Thus, the only middling status between citizens and aliens
existing in current United States law is not really functional.
Likewise, the international agreements and compromises forged
to smooth over the occasionally conflicting obligations of dual
nationals do not offer any new, mediate citizenship statuses but
instead simply reconcile the conflicts between dually held citizenship by settled rules aimed at preserving full dual nationality. They
thus offer no guidance as to the construction of viable partial
citizenships. Citizenship is therefore for all intents and purposes
an all or nothing affair.'
C.

Treaties and Citizens

It seems settled law that the United States cannot make a
"treaty" with its own citizens.2" 2 Indeed, this is tautological, since
the concepts of "treaty" and "citizen" are by definition mutually exclusive. 21 3 Moreover, since 1871 the United States has been

208. Id. (Wellford, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
209. Id. at n.2.
210. Id.
211. While it might nonetheless be possible to construct a partial, mediate type of
citizenship, such a status would not serve the interests of some, if not many, Indians
in retaining full United States citizenship, and thus no attempt is made here to design
such a status.
212. See, Wiggan v. Connolly, 163 U.S. 56, 60 (1896) (treaty with Indians would have
been invalid if the Indians had been citizens).
213. A treaty is a "compact made between two or more independent nations." BLACK'S
LAw DIcIONARY (5th ed. 1979); accord3 Bouvsm's LAw DiCnoNNARY (3d rev. 8th ed. 1984).
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barred by statute from concluding treaties with any "Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States." 2 '4 Unless
the 1871 Act is repealed or is constitutionally challenged and
defeated,2"' the United States is forbidden from concluding treaties
with the Indian nations, whether those nations are considered to
be composed of sovereign Indians, United States citizens or dual
Indian/American nationals.
If, as advocated above, Congress' plenary legislative powers
over the Indian nations were abolished and Indian nationhood
recognized, the 1871 Act would also have to be repealed. This
repeal would be a logical entailment of any recognition of Indian
sovereignty, since as it stands the Act prevents, or at least permits the prevention of, any Indian input or consent into their relations with the United States. Despite the current practices of making
"executive agreements" in a manner approximating treaty negotiation and of utilizing Indian input in the legislative process,21 6 repealing the 1871 Act would be an imperative, particularly because of
the modem interpretation of the Act as incorporating a far-reaching
plenary congressional power and because the potential for the exercise of such power would always exist. The Act's continued existence would be inimicable to the idea of full Indian national
sovereignty and would likewise not be in keeping with the tenor
of relationships between sovereign powers. Moreover, should the
United States go so far as to recognize Indian nationhood, it hardly
seems logical for it to continue to bar itself statutorily from dealing with such new Indian nations.
What is needed, and what the repeal of the 1871 Act would
recognize, is a recognition of the necessity of Indian consent and
cooperation in the United States' relationship with the Indian
nations. This would mean a revitalization of the idea of freely
and fairly negotiated treaties and agreements, however denominated
semantically. The procedural technicalities of how the United States
enacts its agreements with Indian nations, whether as treaties with
a two-thirds concurrence of the Senate or as legislation by a majority of both Houses, should be a matter internal to the United
States as a matter of its constitutional separation of powers doctrine. The only concern of the Indian nations in such matters would

214. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982). See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
215. The latter is somewhat unlikely given the Supreme Court's acceptance of the 1871
Act. See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203 (1975).
216. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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be to ensure that, however it was enacted, any agreement would
be free of domestic legal impediments and constitute a valid and
binding agreement and obligation of the United States in accordance with United States law. However, recognition of Indian nationhood, the abolition of plenary power and the repeal of the
1871 Act would still not resolve the problem of a country making
treaties with its own citizens.
This problem would obviously not arise with regard to Indians
who held only one citizenship. Were an Indian to renounce his
or her Indian heritage and retain only United States citizenship,
the Indian nation to which that person belonged would have the
power and it can be assumed would use it to take whatever
measures it felt necessary to exclude such persons from the benefits
of its citizenship and its treaties. Likewise, an Indian who
expatriated himself deliberately from the United States would not
share in the benefits and privileges of United States citizenship,
and making a treaty with such persons would thus be exactly like
concluding foreign treaties. Were an entire Indian nation to renounce United States citizenship, it would place itself back into
what had been the historical manner of Indian treaty making, the
negotiation and conclusion of treaties between independent
sovereign powers.2" 7
The problem that would arise would be in the case where the
members of an Indian nation retained or established dual citizenship. Again assuming that in the case of Indian nationhood the
statutory bar of the 1871 Act would be removed, the question
remains whether treaties could be concluded with Indians who
are also United States citizens.
Barsh and Henderson, though arguing for a different program
than nationhood in their call for a system of "treaty federalism," 2"'
do introduce the useful concept of a "compact." While the distinction between a treaty and a compact is somewhat unclear, at least
as presented by Barsh and Henderson 21 9 and also by the Framers
in drafting the Constitution, 220 there is a sense in which a concep-

217. See supra notes 80-84, 110 and accompanying text.
218. See L. BAgsH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 7, at 270-82.
219. See id.at 272-73, 275-76.
220. "The Constitution recognizes a distinction between 'treaties' and 'agreements'
or 'compacts' but does not indicate what the difference is." TI CONSTIrTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doe. No. 82, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 505 (1973).
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tion of a compact would allow the United States to negotiate and
' 22
contract with a political entity which is not entirely "foreign." '
The view held by the Framers that the Articles of Confedera-

tion and the Constitution were compacts,222 and their view that
any agreements between the states were "compacts" forbidden
by the Constitution unless made with the federal government's

consent, 223 work to yield a definition of a "compact" as an agreement between independent political subdivisions of a polity which

"restructures the governing of the parties, establishes a permanent political relationship, and flows from the consent of the

people.

' 224

Thus, if one views a sovereign Indian nation comprised

of dual nationals as a collectivity of United States citizens con-

stituting a distinct political entity, then an agreement between such
entity and the United States could be seen as a compact analogous

to an agreement between a state and the federal government and
thus would not run afoul of the prohibition on a country treating
with its own citizens. Indeed, on such a reading of the term "compact," the modern practice of concluding Indian "executive
agreements," approved by the courts, could be seen as "compacting." This reading is reinforced by the fact that under the Consti-

tution any agreements between Indian tribes and the states require

federal consent,22 5 just as do agreements between the states them-

selves under what is known as the "compact clause.

' 226

A 1978

bill designed to grant general federal approval to such Indian/state
227

agreements was in fact titled the "Tribal-State Compact Act.

221. Legal dictionaries define a treaty as a "compact between two or more independent nations." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979); accord 3 BoUvmR's LAW
DICTIONARY (3d rev. 8th ed. 1984) Thus the idea of a compact is the foundational idea,
which is transformed into a treaty depending on the nationhood status of the compactors.
The dual citizenship held by the members of an independent tribe might thus upset the
idea of a "treaty," since the Indian nation might not be considered fully "independent,"
but the underlying concept of a "compact" would be unaffected.
222. See L. BARsH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 7, at 270-78.
223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
224. L. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 7, at 276 (discussing the "principles criteria
of compact.").
225. This is because the Indian commerce clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and
the treaty clauses grant exclusive power over Indian affairs to the federal government.
See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text; Comment, supra note 2, at 557-60. The
necessity of this consent was first codified in the Trade and Intercourse Act of the 1790s.
See 1 Stat. 136 (1790); 1 Stat. 329 (1793); 1 Stat. 469 (1796).
226. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
227. For a history of this unenacted legislation, see Comment, supra note 2, at 522-28.
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A more direct approach than the idea of "compacts" to the
problem of developing a treaty-like relationship between the United
States and an Indian nation, many of whose members have retained
or acquired United States citizenship, would be to simply
acknowledge the fact that the Indian nation is being dealt with
qua nation, and not as a collectivity of United States citizens.
The nationhood of the Indian tribe would be both de facto and
de jure, and the Indian citizenship of its members would likewise
be bona fide. The legitimate "foreign" nature or aspect of the
Indians' dual nationality could be viewed in isolation, especially
since it is that status and that status alone which prompts the
treaty in the first place. The fact that many or all of the Indians
so treated with are also United States citizens could be disregarded
as superfluous except to the extent that it would have an impact
on the specific terms of the treaty, i.e., the negotiation of the
treaty's terms would not be isolated from context in the same
way the execution of the treaty would be. 221 Moreover, even if
the United States citizenship of the Indians could not legitimately
or legally be disregarded, the Supreme Court has upheld the validity
of legislation which particularly favors Indians over other
citizens. 229 Thus, other American citizens could not state a claim
on equal protection or other grounds against the preferential treatment given an Indian or a tribe, even if the Indian or a substantial portion of the tribe holds United States citizenship.23 0
D.

Consent and Citizenship

The principle of consent has animated this article's normative
arguments, which have sought to establish a constitutional basis
and framework for a treaty-based, consensual and cooperative
relationship between the United States and "the nations within." ' 23'
The concept of consent also raises an issue concerning Indian
American citizenship. Taking as a point of departure the holding
in Elk v. Wilkins 23 2 that an Indian could not make himself a United

228. Much as it is, albeit on a smaller scale, when the United States conducts foreign
relations with countries whose citizens do or might possess dual citizenship.
229. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
230. The only limitation would be Mancari's rational basis test for upholding such
preferential treatment. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555.
231. See V. Deloria, Jr., & C. Lyttle, supra note 165.
232. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
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States citizen without the express consent of the United States,233
it could be argued conversely that the United States cannot confer
or impose citizenship on Indians without their express consent."'
Indeed, dictum in several Supreme Court cases and an 1870 Report
of the Senate Judiciary Committee had all drawn the conclusion
that Indians could not be made citizens automatically without their
consent. 2"1American Indians have continually urged and affirmed
this principle and held themselves not to be United States citizens. 236
DeLoria notes that after the passage of the 1924 Indian citizenship act the
Iroquois politely sent a note to the United States informing the
government that they were not then, had never been, and did
not intend to become American citizens. They would not, they
stated, consider that the 1924 statute had any effect with respect
to them. They have never wavered from that official position
in the years since.2 37
The issue that thus arises is whether or not the 1924 citizenship
act, or any of the prior citizenship acts which operated to confer
citizenship on Indians automatically, in fact validly established
Indians as citizens if such acts imposed citizenship and its attendant obligations without Indian consent.
This issue, however, has not been substantively pressed by
modem American Indians, though it remains part of their rhetoric.
This is in part due to the omnipresence of the United States and
the realization of the stark imbalance of power between the Indian
tribes and the United States. 2" In order to work within the United
States' political system for Indian rights and benefits, Indians must

233. Id. See also supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text; L. Barsh & J. Henderson,

supra note 7, at 69-74.
234. See L. BARSH & J.

HENDERsON,

supra note 7, at 276 n.17.

235. See id. at 71-73; supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.

236. See V.
(1983).

DELORIA, JR., & C. LYTTLE, AMERICAN INDLANS, AmRICAN JUSTICE 218

237. V. DELOlIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAil OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 18 (1985 ed.). Deloria also relates how the Iroquois had managed
to avoid the citizenship question and the question of the United States' power to conscript
Indians during the First World War by independently declaring war on Germany and
authorizing Indians to serve in the United States Armed Forces as allies. Id.
238. Even some of the most ardent Indian advocates feel that separation of the Indian
Nations from the United States "is practically impossible." R. Barsh & J. Henderson,

supra note 7, at 274.
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be citizens. In addition, participation in some social welfare programs of which Indians are beneficiaries are restricted to citizens.",
Another potential reason for the conferring and acceptance of
Indian citizenship proceeds from the fact that the United States
for a long time has declined to recognize Indian tribes as "foreign"
nations,24 0 and thus not enforcing citizenship with regard to Indians
would result in their being "stateless" from the point of view
of the United States, a status not favored in the law.24
This article will not address the question of whether the presentday United States citizenship of the American Indians is valid if
not consented to, nor whether as a general principle a citizen needs
to consent to a grant of citizenship for it to be valid and for its
attendant obligations to attach. It is clear that the United States
may grant citizenship to whomever it might wish. 42 It is likewise
clear that an Indian or any other citizen may deliberately expatriate
himself from the United States as provided for by statute. 243 Given
the United States' power to confer citizenship and an Indian's
right to renounce it, the only question presented by the issue of
consent to citizenship for an American Indian is whether he or
she may declare to not be a citizen as a defense to an imposition
by the United States of an obligation based on a prior presumption of citizenship. For example, could an Indian claim that lack
of consent to United States citizenship was a defense to an action
for back taxes or provided an exemption from conscription? The
argument is for the most part moot, however, since it seems
unlikely that this argument would sway any United States court.
The power of the United States and the now long-standing
presumption of American citizenship for Indians would render
such a defense trivial. As two prominent Indian authors noted
in an analogous context, when the Indians took up arms a century
ago, it constituted an official state of war; when Indians took
up arms in 1973 at Wounded Knee, their actions were considered

239. V. DELORIA, JR., & C. LYTTm, supra note 236, at 217.
240. This goes back to Chief Justice Marshall's "domestic dependent nations" for-

mulation in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
241. See Comment, supra note 172, at 301 (discussing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86

(1958)):. id. at 314 (discussing the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness).
242. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See, e.g., Pub. L. 88-6, 77 Stat. 5 (1963) (making

Sir Winston Churchill an "honorary citizen of the United States.")
243. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 187-98 and accompanying text.
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"merely criminal, perhaps treasonous. ' 241 Because of this inflexible political, economic, military, and now long-standing reality,
the question of whether the current fact that Indians are American
citizens with or without their consent is correct or incorrect from
a moral or other standpoint will not be addressed. When the Indian
nations were in fact separate from the United States, the concept
of consent to citizenship was an issue. Now that it is necessary
to separatethe Indian nations from the United States, any treaty
of separation and independence would necessarily have to include
provisions detailing the citizenship of the tribe and its future
'members. Because a separation would have to be worked out as
a matter of first principles, no question of presumptions about
citizenship or other matters would exist. Positions taken in contrast to such assumptions, such as the position that consent is
required of the citizen, would be moot.
Conclusion
The main thrust of establishing a consensual and cooperative
relationship between the United States and independent sovereign
Indian nations should not be lost in the confusion of technicalities
concerning treaties, compacts, dual nationality and the like. Undoubtedly a broad restructuring of the United States/Indian relationship such as this article advocates will require the passage of
new statutes, the repeal of old ones, complex and difficult treaty
negotiations, the overturning of decades of Supreme Court case
law and a fundamental shift in attitudes from treating Indians
as conquered peoples to recognizing them as sovereign nations.
The central thesis of this article, however, is that not only would
the recognition of Indian sovereignty fit within our constitutional
scheme, but further that the Constitution in fact presupposes and
requires the implementation of such a scheme. The government
of limited, enumerated powers established by the Framers has
grown and expanded its power and jurisdiction over American
citizens and over the states, and that process is both unlikely to
be reversed and in the view of many has been beneficial. However,
as demonstrated in this article, the single most important constitutional support for this expansion, the modern interpretation
of the commerce clause and its reliance on the national political
process, is completely inapplicable to the situation of the American

244. L. BARsH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 7, at 274-75.
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Indians. What is particularly dismaying is the fact that the Supreme
Court had sanctioned the exercise of congressional plenary power
over Indians, a power much broader than Congress' modern commerce clause power, decades before the modern interpretation of
the commerce clause appeared. As far back as 1886 in United
Stares v. Kagama24' the Court had upheld a power in Congress
which was unlimited, unconstitutional and
over Indian nations
2
unreviewable. 11
The moral and constitutional command of recognizing Indian
sovereignty must be heeded, and while the latter sections of this
article have offered some suggestions as to the logistics of defining citizenships, a trust relationship and a system of treaty-making,
such matters must not be seen as obstacles to or even as the main
questions to be addressed in regard to Indian empowerment and
the establishment of a United States-Indian relationship based on
consent and cooperation. What must be seen as the key question
is whether the United States. will recognize the inherent, original
and sovereign nationhood of Indian nations which was presupposed and acknowledged by the Founding Fathers.
The United States will most likely always possess the political
and military power necessary to preserve its national security, certainly as far as independent Indian nations might be concerned,
and thus there is little possibility that an independent Indian natiort might ally with the Soviet Union or some other antagonist
of the United States, develop nuclear weapons, or take some other
action incompatible with the United States' national interests. What
must be made clear is that is exactly the Framers' understanding,
a conception since eroded and one which needs to be recovered.
In his seminal opinions, Chief Justice Marshall recognized and
upheld on the grounds of political necessity the limiting of the
Indian tribes' ability to freely alienate lands and to treat with the
European powers. However, he did not seek constitutional support for such ideas because they were not constitutional
questions-they were questions of foreign policy. Likewise, he did
not infer power over the Indian nations' internal affairs from the
United States' assertion of political power with respect to their
external affairs but instead explicitly denied the existence of such
power.547

245. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).

246. See Comment, supra note 2, at 526-29.
247. See supra notes 4 & 42 and accompanying text; Comment, supra note 2, at 514-22.
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The Court's later assertions of broader federal power over the
Indian nations, as exemplified by cases like Kagama, nonetheless
echoed Marshall's view in that the Court did not view the United
States' power as being constitutionally derived but rather as
historically and politically contingent. The Kagama Court saw the
United States' power as a function of the dependence and historical
decline of "a race once powerful, now weak and diminished,''248
and held that there was a commensurate requirement that the
United States be charitable toward them and legislate in their (erroneously) perceived interests. While the Court's holding was racist,
paternalistic, proselytical and devoid of any recognition of the
United States' responsibility for the Indians' situation, it was at
least consistent with the Constitution and prior Marshallian constitutional jurisprudence." '
It was only after the plenary power era, when the Indians' position as completely subjugated, assimilated, enfranchised and
geographically surrounded had been fairly well established, that
the Court found the need to "constitutionalize" the United States'
assertion of power over them. The historical and constitutional
erroneousness of these attempts has been explored and
demonstrated above. What is necessary now is not only a recognition of the lack of constitutional support for the plenary power
doctrine but also redress of the earlier historical, economic, political
and military contingencies which first gave rise to the United States'
desire and occasional need to exert power over the Indians. A
return to a consensual and treaty-based relationship between
sovereign Indian nations and the United States would not only
be correct constitutionally (from both an original intent and a
political process protection standpoint) but would also work to
reverse the tragic history of the Indian nations' relationship with
the now great nation which in its infancy they nurtured and inspired.2 50 Only then would "thanksgiving" be appropriate.

248. 118 U.S. at 383. See supra note 22.
249. The Kagama Court explicitly denied the possibility that either commerce clause,
the treaty power, the property clause or any other constitutional provision supported the
exercise of the federal power which the Court nonetheless upheld. See 118 U.S. at 378-80;
Comment, supra note 2, at 528.
250. Both Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson were inspired in their political
thought by Indian examples of democracy and comity. See Comment, supra note 2, at
513; B. JOHANSEN, FORGOTRTN FoUNDERs (1982).
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